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Abstract
Near-field contactless payments using contactless cards or NFC devices are quickly becoming 
a quicker and more convenient alternative to conventional means of carrying out small value 
purchases. Along with their increased popularity, there are rising concerns regarding their 
security. Existing research has shown that certain attacks can be used successfully against 
contactless technology, but it is unclear how such attacks can be translated into a feasible and 
clear threat to a user’s privacy and financial security. Therefore there is a need for an evaluation 
to determine whether physical layer based attacks could be used by attackers to cause financial 
or anonymity loss to an individual.
This dissertation presents the design and implementation of an inconspicuous, easily concealable 
and portable system tha t could be used to reliably eavesdrop contactless transactions. This 
includes guidelines on the effective and efficient design of eavesdropping antennas, including 
the use of large metallic structures already within the vicinity of such an attack, along with the 
assembly of a communications receiver consisting of readily available electronics with a moderate 
cost.
Results are also presented in the form of a quantitative analysis of the enabling technology in 
terms of frame error rate dependence on eavesdropping distance and H-field strength using two 
antennas; a modified shopping trolley and a small loop antenna. The dissertation ends with 
a case study highlighting realistic security and privacy attack scenarios which could utilise the 
eavesdropping distances achieved during the quantitative analysis with the technology presented 
in this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 C ontactless T ransactions
Near-held contactless transactions have been employed in various parts of the world, with varying 
degrees of popularity and consumer adoption. In its simplest form, such a transaction relies on 
short range wireless Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) based technology that uses radio 
waves in the High Frequency (HF) band to enable communication between a reader and a client 
up to about 10 cm apart [1].
They have been used extensively by telecommunication providers in Asia, particularly in Japan 
(SKT, DoCoMo) and Hong Kong in China over the last decade in the form of ticketing and 
access control [2]. In the USA early adoption was low but is now on the rise, best illustrated by 
v i s a ’s success at getting Bank of America to participate in their pilot payment system for New 
York Subway and taxis accepting contactless payments [3]. In Europe, specifically in the UK, 
adoption of contactless transactions hasn’t been very popular but is currently gaining momen­
tum. Examples include the Oyster card [4] used by Transport For London (TFL), responsible 
for the operation of public transport in London, and various retail banks issuing contactless 
credit and debit cards [5].
The impact of contactless transactions on people’s daily lives is starting to become more evident 
the more such transactions mature. Looking for example at the Oyster card system, it has 
managed to greatly simplify and speed up public transport in London [6]. Its success led to 
its adoption by buses, trams and London overground trains. Recently TFL announced plans 
to extend the range of products supported by its contactless system by including contactless
16
(a) An NFC equipped mobile phone 
and contactless PoS term inal
(b) A contactless sm artcard
Figure 1.1: Near-field contactless devices
debit /  credit cards as means of paying for transport, in addition to the existing Oyster card [7].
Contactless cards though are not the only way of implementing contactless transactions. A 
number of mobile phone manufacturers have started to equip their products with Near Field 
Communication (NFC) capabilities [8]. NFC is a technology tha t incorporates a contactless 
reader and ‘tag ’ in a single package. This allows the NFC device to initiate /  accept a transaction 
(receive a payment from a friend for example) or assume the role of a contactless card (tag) and 
carry out a transaction at a participating cashier. The NFC technology is accessed through an 
application, a wallet application for example, tha t stores an individual’s financial information 
inside a Secure Element (SE) within the NFC device. Google has recently developed Google 
Wallet that allows customers in the USA to carry out contactless payments using their NFC 
equipped devices [9]. As shown in a trial [10], consumers are happy to use their phones to carry 
out payments. I t’s more likely today for someone to leave their house and forget their wallet or 
credit card, rather than their mobile phone [2|.
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1.2 Im plem entations of C ontactless T ransactions
The ISO 14443 standard governs the design and implementation at the Physical layer (PHY) of 
the vast majority of products making use of Near-held contactless transactions. For instance, 
ticketing applications use ISO 14443 compliant contactless cards equipped with a SE often 
referred to as the ‘chip’. In the case of the Oyster card, this chip is part of the MiFare family 
developed by NXP and its behaviour is governed by guidelines based on ISO 14443. Payment 
applications on the other hand (credit /  debit cards) are based on the same ISO 14443 standard 
at a physical level but they come equipped with a chip based on EMV Contactless specifications 
(EMVCON).
EMV is a standard developed jointly by EuroPay, Mastercard and VISA tha t governs the be­
haviour of conventional contact based chip cards, EMV certified Point of Sale (PoS) terminals 
and ATM machines certified to accept debit and credit card transactions. EMVCON [11] is the 
equivalent governing standard for contactless cards, based on the EMV standard for contact 
based cards.
NFC capable devices can emulate MiFare for popular ticketing applications and EMVCON for 
debit /  credit card transactions. NFC devices also support a third mode of operation referred 
to as ‘Peer-to-Peer’, allowing two NFC devices to exchange binary files such as images, contact 
cards or music files [12]. The idea of simply tapping a card or NFC device at a PoS, illustrated 
in Fig. 1.1(a), and simply be done with a transaction can be very appealing.
1.3 R esearch M otivation
Features offered by contactless payments such as speed of execution and user friendliness can be 
appealing features of a payments system, as demonstrated by the nearly 23 million contactless 
cards already in circulation in the UK and 13.32% of the world’s smartphones with access to the 
internet being equipped with NFC capabilities [13, 14]. Financial security and privacy preser­
vation, though, will always be fundamental factors for consumers to consider when adopting 
such products and should not be overlooked, especially with such a high rate of adoption. The 
extent to which an attack aimed at implementations based on ISO 14443 and EMV Contactless 
(in particular) could compromise the security and /  or privacy of an individual remains largely 
unanswered.
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Earlier research on the security of contactless transactions focused mainly on either ticketing 
applications based on MiFare chips or NFC peer-to-peer mode. Roland and Langer in [15] were 
the only authors to publish an attack against a card based on EMVCON, capable of causing 
financial loss to the victim. This attack though assumes that the attacker will have physical 
access to the contactless card under attack, in order to copy data from the target card onto a 
fake ‘clone’ card, which makes it a very situational attack and quite unlikely to be of significant 
threat to people who do not misplace /  lose their cards.
A more popular approach used in earlier research is that of eavesdropping attacks, where the 
attacker attem pts to ‘listen on’ an ongoing transaction carried out by a consumer at a shop or 
other PoS terminal. Nearly all published eavesdropping attacks made use of expensive, cumber­
some laboratory grade equipment that could not be used at public places such as supermarkets 
or train stations without raising public suspicion. An eavesdropping attack that cannot be car­
ried out discreetly is of little threat. Additionally, there has been no quantitative metric of 
how successful earlier published eavesdropping attacks were. Success was determined based on 
observations made on oscilloscopes over a range of eavesdropping distances, rather than on bit 
or frame error rates that is the usual metric for assessing the performance of a communications 
system. Recently published eavesdropping attacks did not present any results for varying mag­
netic field strengths. The ISO 14443 standard allows a broad range of magnetic fields, from
1.5 A m“  ^ to 7.5 A m ^ \  where stronger magnetic fields may improve the reliability of a con­
tactless transactions system but also invite further eavesdropping distances. Since the resulting 
magnetic field strength to be used for a particular implementation is up to the discretion of the 
manufacturer of the contactless system, a set of experiments and measurements across the whole 
range specified by the governing standard is required in order to obtain a complete understand­
ing of the threat eavesdropping attacks can pose. Finally, no scenarios relying on eavesdropping 
attacks that could be carried out over a considerable distance and cause tangible financial loss 
to a victim have ever been published.
Financial security though should not be the only concern of users of contactless transactions. 
Despite living in an era where privacy attacks against individuals are becoming increasingly 
common, the public is slow to react or even protest against such attacks. The scarcity of 
research on how effective various implementations of contactless transactions are at preserving 
the privacy and anonymity of their users, does not help raise the already low public awareness of 
these issues. Therefore the relatively unstudied area of privacy preservation in products based
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on EMV Contactless and the lack of pragmatic implementations of eavesdropping attacks has 
given motivation to design and implement an eavesdropping system that could be utilised to 
compromise the financial security and anonymity of users of contactless products over a distance, 
without raising any suspicion.
Additional motivation for using eavesdropping as the ‘attack vector’ for carrying out these 
attacks came from the fact that EMVCON is largely based on specifications applying to conven­
tional EMV contact based cards [11]. This fact led to the suspicion that some of the information 
exchanged during a contactless transaction may be unencrypted. Given the promise for speed of 
execution and the limited processing power of contactless cards, encrypting every piece of infor­
mation would take too long and defeat the original purpose of such transactions. Additionally, 
a communication taking place down a wire, such as a conventional contact based card transac­
tion, is inherently more difficult to eavesdrop than one that is being transm itted over the air and 
anyone capable of intercepting the transmission can listen in on it by using an eavesdropping 
system. In the case of a wired transmission, the eavesdropper needs to tap the communica­
tion line while in an over-the-air transmission, it is enough to point the rogue antenna in the 
right direction. Since EMV specifications were made for a communication channel not directly 
threatened by eavesdropping, some information that was judged as less sensitive (such as the 
cardholder’s name and the primary account name) were transm itted unencrypted [16].
Such an eavesdropping system should also ultimately serve as a tool to help raise public aware­
ness and scepticism when it comes to people adopting contactless transactions in their daily lives. 
In order to achieve these motivational goals, this thesis focused on presenting a low budget, in­
conspicuous, easily concealable and portable system that could be assembled by a cash-deprived 
attacker. Such a system could be used to launch realistic attacks without need for physical 
access to the victim’s card as in the case of earlier research by Roland and Langer [15].
1.4 Structure of T hesis
The rest of this dissertation is outlined as follows. To begin with. Chapter 2 provides a Literature 
Review where additional past research on the security and privacy of Near-field contactless 
transactions using physical layer attacks is discussed and compared against the contributions of 
this thesis.
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Chapter 3 provides necessary background information on Near-held contactless technology and 
general guidelines on the design and implementation of a low cost, portable and inconspicuous 
eavesdropping system.
Chapter 4 introduces novel designs of rogue antennas to be used for eavesdropping, including 
small loop antennas and large metallic structures such as a shopping trolley. Chapter 5 presents 
tests and measurements that evaluate the performance of these rogue antennas in terms of 
capturing and demodulating magnetic fields of various strengths.
Chapter 6 takes this evaluation a step further, by presenting a quantitative analysis in terms 
of Frame Error Rates (FER) of the assembled eavesdropping system in an environment with 
background noise potentially similar to that found in underground stations. Chapter 7 presents 
how the suggested eavesdropping system can be evolved into a tool for launching attacks that 
could potentially compromise both the security and privacy of an individual using contactless 
payments. Conclusions and ideas for future work are given in chapter 8.
1.5 N ovel W ork U ndertaken
Contributions to knowledge presented in this thesis are listed below chronologically:
L Design and implementation guidelines for modifying large metallic structures such as 
metallic shelving or shopping trolleys to act as eavesdropping antennas for Near-held con­
tactless communications.
2. Experimental evaluation of the path loss for eavesdropping with different rogue antenna 
designs that were suggested and implemented.
3. Assembling a portable, easily concealable and relatively inexpensive eavesdropping system 
architecture for a low cost eavesdropper of Type A NFC devices and contactless cards.
4. Designing and implementing a novel software receiver ensuring synchronisation and decod­
ing of eavesdropped communication in a robust and reliable fashion regardless of eaves­
dropping distance or SNR.
5. A quantitative analysis in terms of distance and frame error rate dependence on H-field 
level of the proposed eavesdropping system.
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6. Evaluation of viable scenarios which could utilise the eavesdropping distance demonstrated 
by the eavesdropping system presented in this thesis. Such scenarios include:
(a) The remote harvesting of sensitive information in the form of ARQCs from contactless 
cards that could be used by attackers to withdraw cash at certain ATMs from the 
victim’s account.
(b) A privacy attack tha t could allow location and browsing /  shopping history tracking 
along with targeted advertising. This scenario is made possible by the ability of an 
attacker to extract information such as the cardholder’s name and account number 
from a contactless card.
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on Antennas and Propagation (EuCAP), April 2013.
The following press appearances and presentations have also occurred:
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• Invited speaker at Tomorrow’s Transactions, Consult Hyperion’s 17th Annual forum, 
March 2014.
• Invited speaker at the University of Cambridge, ‘Eavesdropping near field contactless pay­
ments: A quantitative analysis’. Computer Laboratory Security Seminar series, January 
2014.
• BBC News Technology, ‘Contactless payment data can be picked up at a distance’, October 
2013.
• JET Engineering and Technology Magazine, ‘Hacking contactless with homemade technol­
ogy’, Vol.8, issue 11, November 2013.
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Chapter 2
Security and Privacy Attacks on 
Contactless Transactions
For an attack against contactless payments to pose a realistic threat and cause concern amongst 
the public, it has to be feasible from over a certain distance from the target. Attacks that require 
possession of a contactless card in order to pose any threat were dismissed as they do not exploit 
the contactless interface. Such attacks could also be used against contact cards with potentially 
equal levels of success meaning they were not developed for contactless cards.
Therefore, in pursuit of an attack that could be launched over a distance, the following literature 
review was conducted to identify existing remote attacks and their limitations or potential 
for improvement. Having established that eavesdropping attacks pose the greatest threat for 
financial or privacy loss, due to the nature of EMVCON as discussed in Section 1.3, emphasis was 
therefore placed on recent eavesdropping attacks and determining whether they could be further 
improved. Eavesdropping falls under the broad category of physical layer attacks. Alternative 
forms of attacks were considered and also presented in this chapter.
Eavesdropping, however, is but means to an end. The final part of this chapter includes re­
cent attem pts at causing financial harm or compromising privacy, aimed at both contact and 
contactless cards. Additionally, it discusses how such attacks could benefit from a reliable and 
inconspicuous eavesdropping system in becoming more effective.
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2.1 Software and H ardw are B ased  A ttacks
Security and privacy are topics that need to be examined at both software and hardware layers 
of contactless technology in order to understand what is possible.
2.2 Softw are B ased  A ttacks
Contactless transactions are not limited to financial products such as bank issued cards or 
ticketing systems. Contactless technology is also being implemented in smart posters found in 
public places such as airports. The principle behind smart posters is that the owner of an NFC 
device scans the poster in order to receive information such as map directions or a promotional 
offer at a nearby shop. Such smart posters have been deployed by Enlighten [17] and due to 
their popularity, they have already been under scrutiny by researchers.
Mulliner in [18] suggests an attack where a user’s mobile phone would crash every time it is 
brought near a malicious NEC tag. This can be achieved by placing an RFID sticker that 
contains a malformed message over a legitimate RFID tag. He also proves that it is possible 
to exploit a vulnerability in the J2ME SDK to carry out phishing attacks. In order to do so 
they developed a proof-of-concept NFC worm that was put on an NFC poster tag. The worm 
points to some malicious code on the internet and J2ME will download it without asking for 
confirmation. The worm could be used to delete phone entries, messages or upload personal 
information. Another potential issued with current SE used in the Nokia devices highlighted 
in [18] was the fact that the SE had only a small amount of on-board memory. This could 
potentially be exploited with a buffer overflow type of attack.
Software based attacks due to their target demographic being limited to NEC equipped devices 
and their reliance to some extent on some form of social engineering, were quickly ruled out as 
a possible area of further investigation. Getting an individual to scan a malicious tag with an 
NFC device would infect it with some sort of virus or worm but if the ‘bait’ (scanning the tag) 
is not taken, then the attack fails. Therefore, it was decided to emphasise entirely on hardware 
based attacks.
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2.3 H ardware B ased  A ttacks
Hardware based attacks have been published under two broad categories, each with its own 
unique characteristics and requirements. The most relevant and recently published work from 
both categories is presented in the following subsections.
2.3.1 Side channel attacks
During every electronic process that is executed by a chip, a physical footprint is left behind. 
For instance, when plain text is passed through a cryptographic device two by-products are 
generated. One of them is the wanted cipher text, and the second is the unwanted footprint 
in the form of timing information, power dissipation, electromagnetic field, sound or light. The 
unwanted footprint can potentially be captured and processed using side channel attacks. A side 
channel attack is performed by observing the physical quantities emitted by the target device 
with a device like an oscilloscope or a Field-Programmable-Gate-Array (FPGA).
Side channel attacks are differentiated into active and passive attacks. Active attacks are based 
on forcing the device under attack to its limits, hence forcing glitches and errors. Passive attacks 
simply observe the device under normal operating conditions while monitoring its footprint 
(electromagnetic radiation) as presented by Verbauwhede in [19]. W hat makes side channel 
attacks threatening is the fact that they are very difficult to detect while being cheap to set-up. 
The downside is tha t they require a lot of measurements, so they need to be run for a certain 
period of time before they can produce meaningful results.
Side channel attacks are feasible because many components found in phones and other electronic 
devices, e.g. EMV chips, unintentionally ‘leak’ signals that could reveal potentially sensitive 
information. For instance, any Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) chip will 
draw additional power when it is making a ‘0’ to ‘1’ transition. It will also run hotter during 
that period. An attacker monitoring those two physical quantities could potentially determine 
the information being output by that CMOS device [19].
From the above examples it should be evident that in order for an attacker to be able to use side 
channel attacks on a contactless device or card, he would need to be in possession of the target. 
This requirement was the key reason for the dismissal of side channel attacks, as they did not 
fulfil the requirement for the potential attack being feasible from a ‘threatening’ distance. This
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of a skimming attack
makes it less of a concern for the general public. Therefore, it was decided to narrow down the 
search for a hardware based attack to those targeting the physical layer from a distance.
2.3.2 Physical layer attacks
The majority of recently published physical layer attacks were in the form of data modifica­
tion, skimming, replay, relay and eavesdropping attacks which are reviewed in the following 
paragraphs.
The authors of [20] presented and discussed the notion of data modification. Data modification 
is the attack where an attacker manipulates the data received by the reader. This is different 
from simply corrupting the received data. This attack largely depends on the level of modulation 
used, either 100% Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) or 10% ASK with Manchester encoding. In 
the case of 100% modulation then the decoder checks for a pause (0 amplitude) in the bit 
duration. A transm itted ‘F may be modified to look like a ‘0’ by filling the pause in modulation 
by superimposing another wave on it. However, it is impossible to modify a 'O’ and make it look 
like a T ’ due to the fact that the two waves need to arrive at the receiver at exactly the same 
time with the same phase in order to add up and produce a modulated T ’.
Other attacks proposed in [20] include skimming attacks where an attacker powers up and 
queries contactless targets in public places, like an elevator, until he gets a response from them. 
An example of such a scenario is illustrated in Fig. 2.1. The ISO 14443 standard states tha t a 
contactless card should respond to any device generating a magnetic field capable of powering 
it up. Vulnerability to skimming attacks has also been identified in [21]. Kirschenbaum and 
Wool in [22] presented how one could built a portable, extended range RFID skimmer capable
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of a relay attack
of reading ISO 14443 tags from up to 25 cm. A solution to this attack is to either keep the NFC 
mode disabled (in the case of mobile phones) or use a case based on Faraday cage, which is 
designed to block magnetic fields from reaching the enclosed device. Skimming attacks are not 
the only potential threat to contactless systems.
Replay attacks, as discussed by the authors of [20], require the attacker to successfully eavesdrop 
a transaction, record it, and attem pt to replay it later at another PoS. This attack shares the 
similar principles and limitations with eavesdropping. Additionally, the success of this attack 
also depends on whether the attacker is capable of breaking the identification procedure used 
by the PoS, whether it is a time stamp or a randomly generated identification code. Khr and 
Wool in [23] managed to successfully program a normal reader to emulate a credit card reader 
and managed to get contactless credit cards to respond to their fake reader. An interesting 
attack that was proposed in their paper was the man-in-the-middle attack. A ‘leech’ tag is 
placed near the target device with the distance between them being up to 50 cm. At the other 
end, the ‘ghost’ reader will initiate a transaction with the PoS, which asks for the credentials 
of the ‘ghost’ reader. The ‘leech’ tag, connected to the ‘ghost’ reader either via 3G or Wi-Fi, 
(provided that latency is low enough) transmits the credentials of the legitimate RFID tag to 
the ‘ghost’ reader, which then passes that information over the PoS. The distance between them 
can be up to 5 m, since a reader generates a stronger magnetic held than a normal passive 
device. An example of this attack is illustrated in Fig. 2.2. In a similar fashion, Hancke in [24]
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of an eavesdropping attack at a supermarket checkout terminal
was also successful at activating the victim’s card from a distance and transm itting the probed 
information to a legitimate reader to complete a transaction. Relay attacks are not limited to 
contactless cards though. Google’s Wallet application, despite being in its infancy, has already 
been put under scrutiny in [25] in the context of relay attacks.
Finally, there is also eavesdropping, where the attacker attem pts to listen in on an ongoing 
transaction between a contactless device and reader, has already been demonstrated as a possible 
attack on contactless cards. In [26] and [27] eavesdropping on contactless communications from 
distances well over 20 cm was shown, invalidating the claim that the operating range of HF RFID 
is within 10 cm and that this short operating range makes contactless transactions inherently 
secure [28]. In all these cases, the eavesdropping antenna may be at some distance away from 
both devices and its success will depend on how easily it is able to receive information transm itted 
by the antennas used in contactless cards or NFC devices [29, 30]. Fig 2.3 illustrates an example 
of an eavesdropping attack, where an eavesdropping antenna connected to a communications 
receiver is used to eavesdrop an ongoing transaction at a supermarket check out point. In a 
widely reported work, Finke and Kelter managed to perform an eavesdropping attack on an 
ISO 14443 RFID reader and tag [31]. The tag and reader were attached together (zero distance 
between tlieni) and Finke and Kelter managed to pick up the communication with a large loop 
antenna from a distance of 1-2 m. Hancke in [32] also performed an eavesdropping attack on 
all three NFC standards, ISO 14443 A /  B and ISO 15693. His results were obtained using a 
commercial antenna and receiver. His attacks were successful when his receiver’s output had a
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Signal-to-noise-Ratio (SNR) greater than 6 dB, which is the level needed by the protocol analyser 
to obtain the correct information. He experimented with an array of loop antennas (3 antennas 
connected together) and he managed to perform attacks from a distance of 8-15 in.
2.3.3 A ttack vector
From all physical layer attacks discussed in this section, a system capable of remotely powering 
up and reliably eavesdropping the response of the target was deemed the one most likely to 
enable the execution of an attack that could cause financial or privacy loss to an individual.
Data modification attacks for example are limited to interfering with an on-going transaction 
and at best causing it to fail due to the modified data. The authors in [20] did not suggest 
how data modification could be used otherwise. Replay attacks on the other hand can cause 
financial loss, but have a much smaller chance of being successful given the use of timestamps 
throughout an EMV based transaction [16]. Additionally, a replay attack system needs to be 
able to reliably eavesdrop thus terming replay attacks an extension of eavesdropping.
Since eavesdropping was found to be the foundation of a potentially successful attack, it was 
selected as the preferred attack vector to aid in the evaluation of concerns regarding the security 
and privacy of individuals using contactless payments. The next section presents the most recent 
eavesdropping attacks.
2.4 R ecent Eavesdropping A ttem p ts
An eavesdropping system was deemed the biggest threat to contactless systems. Recently pub­
lished work was capable of invalidating a key argument about Near-field contactless transactions 
being ‘inherently secure’ due to their short range of operation [1].
However, published results show a wide variety of eavesdropping distances. This, to some 
extent, can be attributed to the different experimental set up each researcher used. In [27], an 
off-the-shelf receiver and eavesdropping antenna were used on a Philips MiEare token and the 
attacker observed uplink communication (token to reader) on an oscilloscope from up to 4 m. 
W hat is unclear, though, is how much of the originally transm itted data can be recovered from 
the signal observed on the oscilloscope. In [33], raw signals were observed from up to 6.5 m 
using a single 1 m loop as an eavesdropping antenna but there is no mention of any specific
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details on the receiver set-up. A reader generating a measured magnetic held of 3.1 A m “  ^ and 
an ISO 10373-6 compliant smartcard were used. Eavesdropping was carried out with single loop 
antennas with diameters of 30 cm and 50 cm. Respectively binary data was recovered from up 
to 3.5 m. No work was presented on EMV based products.
In [32], a similar signal processing approach was used along with commercially available receiver 
and eavesdropping antenna to recover binary data from 1-3 m depending on the environment in 
which the attack was carried out. In [34], theoretical work was shown tha t aims to give a measure 
of eavesdropping success given a certain distance in the form of achievable Bit Error Rates 
(BER). A variety of noise environments were modelled but no practical results were given. Bit 
recovery in [34] and [35] was achieved using synchronous demodulation (e.g. a coherent receiver) 
in software. In [33], on the other hand, no bit recovery was attempted. In [34], it was shown 
that there is a 15% difference in performance in terms of BER between a coherent demodulator 
and a non-coherent one.
2.5 Security  and P rivacy Breach
By the end of 2011, 44.7% of the total payment cards used worldwide (excluding the USA) 
and 76.4% of deployed PoS terminals were based on EMV specifications [36]. Based on these 
numbers it becomes apparent that EMV specifications govern the behaviour of one of the most 
popular digital transaction platforms in the world. In 2007 the first version of EMVCON [37] 
was released by EMVCo^, effectively introducing contactless transactions as a quicker and more 
convenient way to pay with. Currently there are more than 23 million contactless cards in 
circulation just in the UK [14].
EMVCON is based on EMV specifications for chip cards or mobile devices equipped with NFC 
capabilities. Specifications which scheme operators (e.g VISA, Mastercard) are allowed to cus­
tomise further and create their own schemes as shown in Fig. 2.4. These schemes were tailored to 
communication models were information was more challenging to eavesdrop (card is physically 
present in the PoS). Sensitive information such as personal account number and expiry date are 
currently being transm itted in plain text [38]. One may argue that this approach ensures faster 
transactions, the fact that transm itting over the air is inherently more susceptible to eavesdrop­
ping than transm itting through wires [39] should not be overlooked for the sake of convenience.
 ^A collaboration between American Express, JCB, M asterCard and Visa
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Figure 2.4: Overview of governing standards for EMV based contactless cards and NEC devices
2.5.1 Financial security attacks
In recent years, a number of over the air attacks against contactless transactions has been 
published. In [40] examples of attacks, including relay, skimming and replay, against contactless 
cards issued in the U.S. were presented. The authors of [40] noted that the protocols used 
by the U.S. contactless cards they experimented with, did not appear in the EMV standards. 
The reason why U.S. contactless card issuers chose (at the time) to develop new protocols was 
unknown. W hether the findings of this research apply to EMVCON and its related schemes is 
therefore unclear.
Another example where the contactless interface was put under scrutiny is the work presented 
in [41], where emphasis was placed on skimming and cloning attacks carried out using a mobile 
phone with NEC capabilities. The authors justified the use of a mobile phone as their ‘weapon’ of 
choice due to its form factor tha t could arouse less suspicion in public. Their attack though can 
only be successful if the attacker is able to hover his mobile phone over the victim’s contactless 
device. This is a very situational and limiting scenario. Using a device with limited power (such 
as a mobile phone) does not allow the attacker to skim a contactless device from a distance that 
is long enough to be of noticeable threat. Additionally, unlike what is later presented in this 
thesis, their attack was only tested against an unspecified contactless application referred to as 
‘typical contactless application’ based on offline Static Data Authentication (SDA^).
In a similar cloning attack, Roland and Langer in [15] were successful at cloning an EMV
'SDA is an ageing security feature th a t card issuers are starting  to replace with dynamic da ta  authentication
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contactless card onto a clone by using a mobile phone as a skimmer. The resulting clone can 
be used at a contactless PoS to make a payment. This attack though is limited to terminals 
accepting legacy magstripe transactions only. If the PoS terminal does not support and instead 
wishes to use the more modern and popular EMV mode then the clone card will be rejected. 
Additionally, the use of a mobile phone as the skimmer limits considerably the amount of power 
it can transmit to power up the target. This effectively requires the attacker to be in possession 
of the card he is attem pting to clone making it less of a threat.
The authors of [42] showed how a vulnerability in the randomness of the Random Number 
Generator (RNG) used by certain ATMs combined with a tampered PoS terminal and a user 
participating in a legitimate transaction could make what the authors termed as ‘pre-play’ attack 
a possibility. Whether this attack is usable against contactless cards is unknown.
2.5.2 Loss of privacy and anonym ity
Attacks aimed at compromising the victim’s financial security as highlighted above, are not the 
only threat consumers should be aware of and concerned with. Individual privacy and anonymity 
is a topic tha t has recently been in the public spotlight. Lesk in [43] presents how privacy fits 
into economics and e-commerce and how it is used by companies such as Google and Amazon 
to provide personalised adverts and increase their revenue at the expense of the user’s privacy. 
He points out tha t despite recent privacy related scandals involving mobile phones in the UK 
[44], there is limited public awareness about privacy let alone demands to further strengthen it.
In [45], a reference is made to the fixed identifiers allowed by the ETSI TS 102 622 standard 
(based on ISO 14443) for contactless transactions. The authors suggested that these identifiers 
could be used to link transactions to users of contactless payments. The issue of fixed identifiers 
has also been raised in [46] along with the fact that these identifiers are not encrypted and can 
be read with no authentication of the reader device. Particular mention is made of how this 
identifier could be used for the tracking or identification of a target, or to simply determine 
whether the victim is carrying an RFID transponder (e.g. contactless card). This work assumed 
that fixed identifiers would be used by the manufacturers of contactless devices but the ISO 14443 
also allows the use of randomly generated identifiers. No mention is made of the uniqueness 
of randomly generated identifiers and whether these could also be linked to a user like fixed 
identifiers can. W hat is missing is a privacy attack tha t will work reliably, regardless of what
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type of identifiers a manufacturer chooses to use for his product.
2.6 C onclusions
An attack aiming to cause financial or privacy loss and at the same time be a realistic threat 
to the general public, needs to be usable from a distance from the target. This requires both 
the remote powering and querying of the target but also the ability to listen in on the response 
reliably.
The possibility of remotely powering up a contactless tag from up to 25 cm has been demon­
strated in [22]. The ability to eavesdrop on the other hand, has not been demonstrated to the 
same convincing extent. All previously listed attacks achieved a range of eavesdropping dis­
tances from 1-6.5 m. This variation can be attributed to the different equipment and operating 
conditions. W hat is missing, though, is practical results showing how reliably eavesdropping 
can be carried out, quantifying how much of a transm itted sequence can be recovered at the 
eavesdropping end at various distances.
While other publications have shown existing NFC devices to achieve a successful eavesdrop 
[30], they have addressed the topic from an end to end perspective, whereby the device is trans­
mitting real data and it is evaluated as to whether the eavesdropped data can be quantified in 
any particular fashion. W hat is not known in such tests is the degree of H-field that the device 
transmits. It is only assumed that the reader device is transm itting within the ISO 14443 stan­
dard, which requires a minimum H-field of 1.5 A m“  ^ and a maximum of 7.5 A m " \  though the 
mobile device which receives from the reader is expected to emulate a passive card, which would 
normally backscatter the response back to the reader and is likely to be significantly less than 
1.5 A m “ fi Measurements from [27, 32, 33, 34, 35] relied on often expensive or bulky equipment 
that cannot be easily replicated in a portable system. Additionally, the use of big antennas 
makes the likelihood of carrying out these eavesdropping attacks in a populated environment 
such as a supermarket or train station extremely unlikely due to its peculiar nature causing 
suspicion among bystanders.
This thesis aims to fill-in the gaps highlighted in this section by introducing, building and 
quantitatively analysing an eavesdropping system that is reliable, easily concealable and in­
conspicuous. Based on these characteristics of such an eavesdropping system, proof-of-concept
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scenarios benefiting from such a system leading to possible financial loss and privacy invasion of 
products based on the EMVCON specifications are also presented later on in the dissertation. 
The reason EMVCON products are targeted is because EMVCON is by far the most popular 
standard when it comes to implementing contactless payment systems around the world [11]. 
Experiments presented later on showed tha t the governing standards for contactless payments 
(EMV and EMVCON) do allow for the possibility of such an attack being successful. This is an 
issue that needs to be addressed, not only because the financial security of users of contactless 
payments is at risk but also because of the associated privacy issues.
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Chapter 3
Background to the Near-Field 
Communication System
The principal technology of contactless transaction systems examined in this dissertation is 
RFID. This technology, exists in countless variants whose implementation is governed by an 
equally large number of industry standards [47]. By far the most widely implemented standard 
though for contactless cards and NFC devices, is ISO 14443 [48]. It defines the physical charac­
teristics of contactless implementations such as ticketing (e.g. Oyster) and financial transaction 
systems (e.g. EMVCON based).
Given the widespread implementation of ISO 14443 and the nature of those implementations 
(access control, payments), an attacker in possession of a reliable and inconspicuous eavesdrop­
ping system stands to gain a lot in terms of potentially sensitive information. Before considering 
the assembly of such a system though, an analysis of the key elements of ISO 14443 is presented. 
In depth analysis of higher level standards such as EMVCON is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
although potentially viable attack scenarios were tested and analysed as proof-of-concept based 
on literature reviewed later on in this dissertation.
Having established in the previous chapter the lack of an eavesdropping system that could be 
deployed without suspicion in a public environment such as a local supermarket or underground 
train station, the guidelines for designing and building such a system will be introduced in the 
final part of this chapter.
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3.1 R FID  System s
Wireless transactions are made possible by RFID technology which was developed around World 
War II [49]. An RFID system consists of a ‘transponder’ and a ‘reader’. The reader comes 
equipped with a ‘transceiver’, where the transm itted signal is sent out of the transmit antenna 
to the RFID tag which in turn sends a response received by the receiver. This arrangement is 
illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Separation of transm itted and received signals is the responsibility of the 
circulator and prevents the mixing of information sent and received. The transm itter, receiver, 
circulator and antenna arrangement is the transceiver. The RFID tag on the other hand is 
designed to react to the transm itted request and if that request is destined for the particular 
RFID tag, send back a response. Thus a transponder is created. The reader may send many 
different coded signals at separate intervals in order to determine what tags are available for 
communication. That way, most of the computation and effort is carried out by the reader 
and so the tags can be reduced in size, complexity and not require any power source of their 
own. Consequently, there are both passive and active types of RFID tags tha t this section will 
investigate.
3.1.1 Passive R FID  tags
The main benefit of passive RFID tags is that they do not need to have their own battery 
source, thus they can be easily attached to objects such as plastic cards due to their small 
size and cheap implementation. The implementation of passive RFID tags is made possible with 
digital modulation techniques and the architecture illustrated in Fig. 3.2. When the RFID reader 
radiates a signal onto the tag ’s antenna, this results in an input frequency at the tag, /in- This
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Figure 3.2: Diagram of passive RFID tag architecture
frequency is then fed down two modules, one converts the Alternating Current (AC) to Direct 
Current (DC) and powers up the logic control while the other module is a demodulator making 
use of an envelope (peak) detector. The demodulated binary code will be checked by the logic 
control unit and memory to determine whether the received signal by the reader was intended 
for this tag or not. If it was, then the logic control will activate the backscatter modulation 
which will output a response frequency, /out-
Backscatter radio is based on the ability of the tag ’s antenna to reflect back part of the input 
frequency originating from the reader. Communication is made possible through load modulation 
of the reflected power by the passive tag [47]. Reflected power will be at its highest possible 
value when a very low resistive load (short circuit) is present at the tag. When a higher load is 
used instead, backscattering would be suppressed. Therefore this enables the ‘yes /  no’ input to 
effectively switch the backscattering on or off by controlling a resistive load on the tag. W ith a 
‘yes’, the high voltage input will reduce the resistive load and allow backscattering modulation 
where as when it is low, the load will be high. Passive RFID tags though are not the only means 
of implementing RFID systems.
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3.1.2 A ctive and sem i-active RFID tags
Fully active tags come equipped with a fully active modulator with its own carrier wave instead 
of a backscattering modulator. In order to power up the active modulator active tags require 
their own power source in order to power both the modulator and the logic control. Therefore 
they are usually found on devices such as mobile phones, tablets or portable computers. Such 
tags are more costly to implement but allow more data to be stored on the memory and generate 
responses over a larger range. A semi-active tag on the other hand will only self power its logic 
unit therefore a backscatter modulator is still necessary. Such tags help preserve the battery on 
mobile devices by drawing power to only power a microprocessor, not the RF signal.
3.1.3 Near-field contactless system
In the case of contactless transactions the transponder is the contactless card and the reader is 
either a ticket barrier or a PoS terminal. For a transaction to take place between a transpon­
der and a reader, the transponder first needs to be powered up. Unlike their contact-based 
counterparts, RFID-based contactless cards rely on the reader device for power, through elec­
tromagnetic induction of energy either by electric or magnetic fields [47]. The transponder 
consists of a coupling element and a chip. The coupling element is an inductive coil which 
picks up the electromagnetic held emitted by the reader and then powers up the chip and the 
transaction can now take place. This process is illustrated in Fig. 3.3. Based on their range of 
operation RFID systems come in two configurations, Near-held and Far-held based on which 
zone of a Radio Frequency (RF) antenna the conflguration is operating (the near zone or the 
far zone). The two conhgurations differ in the way they deliver power to the transponder and 
both conhgurations can deliver power in the range of 10 pW to 1 mW [49]. Once energised, the
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transponder uses the reader’s field to exchange data with it. This is achieved by modulating the 
reader’s field with the data to be exchanged either by load modulation (Near-field) or modulated 
backscatter (Far-field), depending on the particular RFID system [47]. This thesis focuses on 
contactless cards and NFC devices which are designed to operate within the near zone of the 
reader’s RF antenna and hence the term Near-field contactless transaction.
3.2 ISO 14443: P roxim ity  C oupling C ontactless Cards and N FC  
D evices
Contactless transactions are carried out with contactless cards. Such cards belong to a subset of 
RFID systems referred to as ‘Proximity Coupling’. Their technical characteristics and behaviour 
are governed by the ISO 14443 standard. Proximity coupling relies on the inductive coupling 
through the interaction with magnetic fields [49]. The following subsections provide a brief 
overview of the ISO 14443 standard.
3.2.1 Radio frequency power and data transfer
The ISO 14443 standard states that a contactless card must be inductively energised by an 
alternating magnetic field transmitted by the reader over a carrier signal at a frequency of
13.56 MHz. The energising field strength generated by the reader is specified to be within the 
range of 1.5-7.5 A m ” 1 This means tha t a contactless card should receive at least 1.5 A m ”  ^ in 
order to be able to respond to a reader device [47].
Once the contactless card has been inductively energised, it is ready to exchange data with the 
reader. The ISO 14443 standard supports two modes of data exchange, ‘Type A’ and ‘Type B’. 
A reader may support both types but must be able to intelligently switch between the two 
because cards will only support a single mode of operation. This thesis concentrates on Type A 
as it is by far the most commonly used type of contactless card. This decision was made so 
that the carried out research will be widely applicable and consequently cause a greater level of 
public awareness of any risks associated with contactless transactions. The principles presented 
and discussed later on (security and privacy attacks) will apply to Type B as well, but the 
implementation method discussed later in this thesis would need to be modified accordingly in 
order to work with the Type B modulation procedure.
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Figure 3.4: Reader and card modulated signals
3.2.2 Type A com m unication interface
In order for a reader to communicate with a Type A contactless card it needs to use Modified 
Miller coding along with 100% ASK modulation of the 13.56 MHz carrier signal, illustrated in 
Fig. 3.4. The contactless card receives an appropriately modulated request from the reader and 
then responds in a different fashion, through load modulation with a sub carrier. This means 
that the card encodes the binary data it wishes to transm it using Manchester encoding and 
On-Off-Keying (OOK) modulation.
3.2.2.1 O n-O ff-K eying m odulation
OOK is a variation of Amplitude Modulation (AM). In AM, the amplitude of a carrier signal is 
varied to match tha t of the message signal by multiplication of the carrier and message signals. 
This causes a ‘ripple’ on the carrier, the ripple being the ‘envelope’ of the carrier, which contains 
the original message. The envelope can be demodulated with the aid of a very simple circuit, 
the envelope detector. How AM differs in the form of OOK is the depth of the envelope. Only 
two states are allowed in OOK, either the carrier signal is fully on or fully off. When a binary 
‘1’ is to be transm itted, the carrier is fully active while in the case of a binary ‘0’ it is fully 
suppressed [50].
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3.2.2.2 M anchester encoding
In Manchester encoding a binary ‘0’ is represented as a positive going transition in the half bit 
period while a binary ‘F is represented as a negative going one. It is one of the most widely 
used data coding methods, especially when overall system complexity needs to be low while 
maintaining a high level of robustness. One of the reasons for its popularity is the inclusion of 
data rate clock with the transm itted message for the benefit of the receiver.
D ata recovery at the receiving end is further aided by the fact that in Manchester coding there 
will always be an average DC level of 50%. In the case of OOK used in Type A systems, 
this translates into the average power being constant and independent of the data stream being 
encoded. Manchester coding dictates tha t there will always be a state transition halfway through 
a transm itted bit, hence the always 50% average DC level and constant power. The Manchester 
encoded data is then mixed with an 847 kHz square wave subcarrier (generated on-board the 
card) using OOK. The result is illustrated in Fig. 3.5. Finally the loaded subcarrier is then ASK 
modulated onto the received 13.56 MHz carrier. This in essence means that the amplitude of the 
carrier is switched (by the card) between two states. The unmodulated (no subcarrier load) and 
the modulated state (subcarrier loaded). The modulation depth percentage (m) will depend on 
the mean amplitude of the loaded subcarrier ui, the mean amplitude of the unmodulated carrier
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uq and can be calculated using:
m — —------  X 100 (3.1)
Uq +  'til
The final response of the contactless card is a 13.56 MHz carrier signal with two sidebands located 
±847kHz from it and centred at 12.7MHz and 14.4 MHz.
3.2.3 Com m unication initialisation and anti-collision
Once sufficiently energised by the magnetic field of the reader, the contactless card now has 
enough voltage (through its coupling element) to power up the on-board microprocessor. First, 
the microprocessor will check in what state the card currently is. For example in the case 
of a dual interface card, it will check whether it has been energised over the contact or con­
tactless interface [47]. The microprocessor then puts the card into ‘IDLE’ mode as specified 
in ISO 14443-3 standard. Before data can be exchanged in the usual Type A mode described 
above, an anti-collision sequence is executed to ensure that the energising reader is not currently 
communicating with another contactless card.
A dynamic binary search tree algorithm is used during the anti-collision process where the reader 
requests tha t any contactless device within its energising field provides its unique serial number 
[47]. In the case of Type A communication, this serial number is known as the Unique Identifier 
(UID). This UID can vary in length, with 4, 7 and 10 bytes being acceptable lengths in ISO 14443. 
A contactless device may come with a fixed value for its UID, linked to the on-board chip, or it 
may be capable of providing a pseudo-randomly generated UID every time it becomes energised. 
This decision is up to the device’s manufacturer. Readers do not differentiate between fixed 
or dynamic UlDs. The uniqueness of the UID allows a reader to select a single device for 
communication when many are found within its operating range. Once it has chosen one, all 
other devices are commanded to enter a ‘sleep’ mode known as IDLE state until the reader 
instructs them otherwise or until they exit the currently energising field [48]. The selected 
device is commanded to enter the ACTIVE state and is ready to proceed to the transmission 
and protocol activation phase.
3.2.4 Transmission and protocol activation
Following a successful anti-collision process and initialisation of the contactless card, the reader 
has to select the desired protocol (also known as application) it wishes to use in order to read
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and process data from the card. A contactless card may come equipped with several such 
applications. For example, in the case of an Oyster card it will be equipped with the MiFare 
application or in the case of a debit /  credit contactless card it may come with EMV based 
applications. These applications are based on proprietary specifications and form a contactless 
card’s equivalent ISO /  OSI layer model illustrated in Eig. 3.6.
3.2.5 NFC devices
NFC is a wireless data interface in a sense similar to Bluetooth or Wi-Fi [47]. Devices such as 
mobile phones that are equipped with NFC capabilities can use it to exchange data between 
them using a 13.56MHz alternating magnetic held as specified in [51]. Additionally though, 
an NFC device can emulate the behaviour of both reader and transponder as specified in [48]. 
This allows a NFC mobile phone to emulate a contactless card in Type A mode and complete 
a contactless transaction at any available contactless reader. NFC devices though, are also able 
to act as readers and energise contactless cards and allow friends for example to send money to 
one another. NFC technology makes this thesis relevant to a much broader demographic that 
includes both users of contactless cards and devices equipped with NFC capabilities.
3.3 Introducing th e  Eavesdropping S ystem
In this section the guidelines for assembling an eavesdropping system that could be used dis­
creetly to launch a financial security or privacy attack against an individual are presented. Such
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Figure 3.7: A shopping trolley used as part of an eavesdropping system
a scenario is illustrated in Fig. 3.7 with a shopping trolley acting as an eavesdropping antenna 
while listening in on an on-going payment at a supermarket cashier. Such guidelines include the 
designing of efficient, inconspicuous antenna designs and key electronic components for building 
a low budget and portable communications receiver.
3.4 A n ten n a  D esign  T heory
As already discussed, proximity coupling contactless cards and NFC devices are designed to 
operate in the Near-held of the reader’s antenna and rely on the reader’s magnetic held to energise 
them through inductive coupling [49]. In order to maximise coupling (transfer of energy) from a 
magnetic held to the contactless card, loop antennas are used. Such antennas are used because 
they are more efhcient at picking magnetic helds, compared to dipole antennas that favour 
electric helds instead. In the case of the reader’s loop antenna, when current hows through it, a 
magnetic held is generated. If another conductor (plain wire) or coil /  loop is brought inside the 
generated magnetic held, a current is induced in it. H  is an indication of the size /  strength of 
the magnetic held generated by such currents [47] and can be calculated using:
with I  being the conductor current and d the distance from the conductor.
3.4.1 Covert antenna designs
Given the frequency of interest (13.56 MHz), the simplest form of an antenna for eavesdropping 
or remote interrogation of a contactless card is a long wire close to quarter of a wavelength (in 
this case 5.5 m). At this length, there will be a resonance in the antenna’s impedance close to
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Figure 3.8: Illustration of a covert antenna attached to a rucksack
the frequency of interest such tha t the antenna can be used either to transm it maximum power 
or alternatively to receive power depending on whether its function is to remotely interrogate or 
to eavesdrop. Such an antenna could be left to lie on the ground, preferably entirely unravelled 
to achieve the best reliability in terms of eavesdropping a transm itted signal.
An antenna over 5 m may not be a convenient option, so it is useful to find a way of reducing the 
size of this antenna, even though this compromises some of its efficiency. A potentially good way 
to allow the antenna to be more conveniently sized is to wrap it around a large rucksack, where 
tape is used to hold the antenna into several turns. The number of windings of the loop antenna 
and their radius affect the magnitude of the magnetic field strength, iT, given a cylindrical coil 
given a distance x  from its centre [47]:
H  = (3.3)
2 X (r  ^ X
Based on this, it should be clear tha t a loop antenna with a high number of windings will be 
much more effective and result in higher received SNR. It is also important that the antenna is 
wrapped around the edge as much as possible so as to best maintain a resonance at the frequency 
of interest. Such an arrangement is illustrated in Fig. 3.8.
3.4 .1 .1  R eso n a tin g  a n te n n a  an d  th e  Q fac to r
An antenna can be designed to resonate at a particular frequency through the use of a capacitor 
connected in parallel with the inductance due to the coil antenna. An antenna achieves resonance
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when its input impedance at a particular frequency has no reactive component.
In the case of many RFID based systems, the resonant frequency is selected to be at the frequency 
of operation of the particular system. In the case of ISO 14443 based systems operating at
13.56 MHz allowing for a number of contactless cards to be energised at the same time (due 
to an anti-collision procedure), the resonant frequency is often chosen to be 1-5 MHz higher 
than the operating frequency. This is due to the fact that the effective resonant frequency of 
two contactless cards within close proximity to each other is always lower than the resonant 
frequency of a single transponder [47]. The Q factor gives an indication of the factor by which 
voltage and current at a circuit increases when that circuit is excited at its resonant frequency. 
The Q factor can be calculated using:
Q  ^  R, I coLc 
u)Lc Rl
where Ri is the internal resistance, Lc the inductance due to the coils of the antenna and R l  
the load resistance [47]. From (3.4) it should be clear tha t very high Q factors can be achieved 
given a high load resistance. A high Q factor equates to a higher induced voltage across the 
antenna. In the case of an eavesdropping antenna where the designer wishes to maximise its 
effective range, the Q factor needs to be maximised [49]. It should be noted though, that as 
the Q factor increases, the effective bandwidth of the antenna will also be reduced therefore 
the designer needs to be aware of this constrain as he risks with a narrow bandwidth not being 
able to recover the transm itted data. A resonant antenna also maximises its efficiency, due to 
both the voltage and current being in phase at the antenna’s terminals. This phase alignment 
also makes matching the resonant antenna to a receiver system more straightforward since there 
is no reactive component contributing to the total impedance of that antenna. An impedance 
matched antenna ensures the maximal efficiency of the whole receiver system. The presence or 
not of reactive components can be visually verified with the aid of a Smith chart [52] displayed 
on a network analyser.
3.4.1.2 R eflection coefficient and antenna bandw idth
The Reflection coefficient or S n ,  is a representation of how much power is reflected from the 
antenna. A transm itting antenna with S n  equal to OdB, is a very poor antenna as all the 
power presented to it is reflected back with nothing being radiated. In the case of a receiving 
antenna, if S n  is equal to — lOdB and if 3 dB of power were delivered to this particular antenna.
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of bandwidth and reflection coefflcient of a small NFC antenna
then — 7 dB of power would be reflected ( or ‘lost’) by the antenna with the remaining power 
‘delivered’ (received).
A network analyser can be used to plot the S u  as a function of frequency. Such a plot would be 
useful in determining the bandwidth of a particular antenna that can consequently help with the 
tuning of the Q factor of the antenna. The bandwidth of an antenna is deflned as the frequency 
range at which the S u  is less than —6 dB. The reflection coefflcient and bandwidth region for 
a typical NFC antenna is illustrated in Fig. 3.9.
3.4.1.3 Large m etallic structure antennas
Another suitable antenna design would be a large metallic structure depending on the envi­
ronment where an eavesdropping attack is likely to be carried out, such as a shopping trolley, 
metallic shelving or metallic fence. In the case of a shopping trolley, a matching circuit is to 
be connected to the front of the trolley in order to achieve an impedance match and enable the 
highest possible Q factor. The disadvantage of such an antenna is that it is not ideally sized for 
maximum efficiency, thus it will contain ohmic losses^ with which it might potentially generate 
more inherent noise and thus an increased noise floor. Further analysis on the performance 
and suitability, along with our experimental measurements, of metallic structures serving the 
purpose of a rogue antenna are presented in the next chapter.
^Voltage drop across a circuit due to its internal resistance
E a v e sd ro p  d is ta n c e  X
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Figure 3.10: A low budget communications receiver for use in an easily concealable eavesdropping 
system
3.5 C om m unications R eceiver
For the eavesdropping system to be complete, a communications receiver capable of demodu­
lating the eavesdropped data samples is necessary. In the following subsections, guidelines for 
assembling such a receiver as that illustrated in Fig. 3.10 are presented.
3.5.1 Low noise amplifiers
A Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) serves the purpose of acting as an entry-point for signals captured 
by an antenna and the rest of the communications receiver circuit. This is due to their ability to 
significantly amplify a captured signal while adding a minimum amount of noise. Their typical 
noise figure (Flna) is about 1 dB with a typical gain (Glna) of 20 dB. The importance of having 
a low noise figure at the entrance of the communications receiver is better explained by Friis’s 
formula used to calculate the noise factor of a receiver, ih-eceiver [53]:
^rece iv er =  -^LNA H -------- ( 3 .5 )
LtLNA
From this formula it is clear that the total noise factor of the receiver is dominated by the noise 
figure of the LNA with the noise figure due to subsequent stages (Fi-est) after the entry stage 
where the LNA is having a much smaller impact. In the case of an eavesdropping system where 
the attacker ideally wants to maximise the SNR, an LNA is the ideal type of component to 
introduce after the eavesdropping antenna.
3.5.2 Filtering
HF radio is popular with amateur radio stations as the wavelength at this frequency band is 
short enough to be reflected back by the Earth’s ionosphere and thus allows for a very long range
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of broadcasting. This means that the level of noise an eavesdropper of contactless transactions 
is likely to face, will vary greatly from day to day as these radio stations do not have a steady 
broadcasting schedule.
In the case of ISO 14443 Near-Field communication, the carrier signal used is centred at
13.56 MHz with the modulated data centred at 12.7 MHz and 14.4 MHz. A band-pass filter 
can be used to filter noise outside the band of interest. Since the carrier signal, which can be 
up to 90 dB higher than the contactless card’s response, does not carry any information (its sole 
purpose is to energise a contactless device), it should also be suppressed at the eavesdropping 
receiver with the aid of a notch filter. Doing so will aid with demodulation if the cost and 
complexity of the receiver system is to kept as low as possible as per one of the motivations for 
this thesis. Circuit diagrams for the filters tha t were used are shown in Appendix A.
3.5.3 O perational amplifiers
The filters discussed in the previous subsection although they serve the useful purpose of sup­
pressing unwanted (interfering) frequencies from the band of interest, they also attenuate the 
wanted signals due to their non-ideal implementation. The losses due to these filters though can 
be compensated through the use of operational amplifiers (op-amps) designed for use at the HF 
band. At 13.56 MHz op-amps are operating in a stable fashion with no degradation in perfor­
mance due to changes in operating conditions such as temperature. During an eavesdropping 
attack the communications receiver might be required to be left running for a long amount of 
time, until there is something to actually eavesdrop on. This would cause a raise in tempera­
ture and potentially affect the smooth operation of the whole receiver, therefore the ability to 
maintain stability regardless of operating conditions is an important design consideration.
Operating stability at the desired frequency though is not the only appealing attribute of 
op-amps. Given their very high input impedance [53], they can provide the high load resis­
tance necessary in order to achieve a high Q factor for the eavesdropping antenna and maximise 
the efficiency and overall performance of the eavesdropping system.
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3.5.4 D em odulation, data sam pling and post-processing
3.5.4.1 D em odulation
The last stage of the communication receiver involves the demodulation of the eavesdropped 
signal and processing it in order to extract any potentially sensitive information. One of the 
most limiting factors of recently published eavesdropping attacks was the use of bulky and 
expensive equipment. The reason for using such equipment was the high sampling frequency 
tha t researchers chose to use. According to the Nyquist sampling theorem in order to get 
an accurate representation of the frequency content of a signal, tha t signal must be sampled 
at a rate of at least twice the frequency of the highest frequency component in that signal 
[54]. For a carrier signal at 13.56MHz, the minimum Nyquist sampling frequency is 27.12 MHz. 
Sampling at this frequency consequently requires laboratory grade and expensive equipment, 
making eavesdropping an unlikely attack for a cash-deprived attacker.
A new approach was taken as part of this thesis, based on the fact that the information of 
interest is loaded onto a 847 kHz subcarrier with the 13.56 MHz not carrying any information. 
It was decided therefore, to use a notch filter to suppress the unwanted carrier along with a 
demodulating logarithmic amplifier (log amp) to recover the data from the modulated subcarrier. 
This would allow an attacker to meet the minimum Nyquist sampling frequency by sampling the 
demodulated signal at a frequency of 1.7 MHz. This demodulation approach, especially when 
compared to coherent demodulation, offers a unique combination of low cost, compact size, fast 
response time (40 ns), high accuracy and stability and low power consumption thus making it 
easily integrated into a battery-powered and more portable communications receiver [55]. The 
output, Foutp of a log amp, given an input voltage of Ifinp is [55]:
Viutp =  fc X log ^  (3.6)
where k is the scale factor and Fref a normalisation constant. Based on (3.6), the log amp can be 
said to mimic the behaviour of an envelope detector. Given that Type A systems rely on OOK 
modulation, this makes a log amp capable of acting as a peak detector, the simplest method of 
demodulation. In the case of Type B systems though where Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) 
is used for modulation, a peak detector would not work. Since this thesis was concentrated on 
Type A systems, a peak detector was chosen nevertheless.
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3.5.5 D ata sampling
Once data has been demodulated, data needs to be recovered back in the form it was transmitted. 
Post processing is used to determine each bit by correlating the samples from which the bit logic 
levels can be evaluated based on the Manchester encoding used in the Type A system. A 
number of samples corresponding to the length of a Manchester encoded bit (9.44 ps based on 
the sampling rate that was used for this thesis) will be cross-correlated with an equal number of 
samples representing both logic ‘1’ and ‘O’. The pair that yields the highest correlation will be 
taken as the originally transm itted logic bit. It is necessary to synchronise the captured signal 
before attempting evaluation of the captured bits. Furthermore, it is inevitable that eventually 
an excess quantity of noise will cause a low signal to noise ratio thus hindering the ability to 
recover data bits. At this point some form of signal conditioning /  smoothing might help reduce 
the impact of noise on bit recovery. In depth details on how this was achieved are presented 
later on in the dissertation.
3.6 C onclusions
The two main building blocks, covert antenna design and communications receiver, of an inex­
pensive and inconspicuous eavesdropping system have been presented in this chapter. The key 
characteristics of ISO 14443 standard and how they affect the design and implementation of 
such an eavesdropping system have also been introduced.
Previous eavesdropping systems used ideal components for reception, demodulation and data 
recovery. For example, Hancke [30] demonstrated the use of a coherent demodulator with a 
loop antenna of 10 cm radius and was successful at eavesdropping the 3 - byte ID of a contactless 
card from up to 60 cm. Coherent receivers have been found to offer a 15% improvement over a 
non-coherent receiver with ASK signals [34], and could achieve the same BER with 3 dB lower 
SNR. In contrast, the experimental work and results presented in later chapters demonstrate a 
budget-oriented, low complexity, practical eavesdropping system. The design opts for minimum 
complexity rather than the best component for each stage. For example, given the extra cost 
and practical difficulty associated with a coherent receiver, a 15% sacrifice in performance was 
considered acceptable.
Based on these characteristics, new designs of covert antennas that could be used without
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arousing suspicion have been discussed, along with optimising parameters such as Q factor 
tuning with the aid of op-amps. Following the motivation for an affordable eavesdropping 
system, readily available electronic components have been suggested for building a non-coherent 
receiver (based around a peak detector and low frequency data sampling) while ensuring optimal 
compatibility with the proposed covered antenna designs.
The next chapter will apply the covert antenna design concepts to test and evaluate the perfor­
mance of eavesdropping antennas based on large metallic structures with maximised efficiency 
through a suitably high Q factor. Further to this the next chapter will show how such antennas 
could be impedance matched to the communications receiver.
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Chapter 4
Rogue Antenna Design
In the previous chapter, theoretical designs for rogue antennas to be used as part of an inconspic­
uous eavesdropping system were presented. The need for such antennas to have a Q factor as high 
as possible was also discussed. This can be achieved through the use of a high impedance load 
together with the rogue antenna, making a large metallic structure together with an operation 
amplifier providing the required high load a potentially effective eavesdropping antenna. This 
chapter presents the design and preliminary evaluation of the performance of such an antenna.
The first part of this chapter will focus upon the design of NFC antennas for communication 
between two devices within proximity less than 10 cm apart. Such an example in the case of 
contactless payments would be a mobile handset communicating with a vending device, such 
as a ticket machine or credit card payment terminal in a café. Such antennas were examined 
both from a transm itter and a receiver point of view. Guidelines on how to improve their 
performance using a Smith chart are also presented along with measurements confirming a 
change in the inductance of such antennas at lower frequencies, contrary to what had been 
previously published.
Applying theory analysed for such antennas, this chapter will investigate the potential use 
of a shopping trolley to act as a rogue antenna from which information could potentially be 
eavesdropped. After modifications that made it usable as an antenna, inductance and resistance 
measurements were taken over a range of frequencies. These values were then used to gain a 
better understanding of how the Q factor of the trolley antenna varies.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of tuned NFC antennas used in a contactless transaction
Load R e s is ta n c eA n ten n a  Coil
Figure 4.2: Circuit model of a H-antenna
4.1 D esign ing  a C oncealab le A nten n a
4.1.1 NFC antenna design theory
A typical example of magnetic coupling loop antennas, otherwise known as 'H-antennas % is 
illustrated in Fig. 4.1. The two ends of such an antenna are connected to an RF transceiver 
with a capacitor placed across in parallel. The DC resistance at the input can be assumed 
to be zero while as the frequency increases, it will create an inductance such tha t a circuit 
model for such an antenna can be represented as that shown in Fig. 4.2 where the antenna 
is represented as an inductor [49]. The parallel capacitor is then connected to the load of the 
transceiver, which will in this case be assumed to be purely resistive. Were there to be a reactive 
component at the transceiver input, it can be easily cancelled out by applying a series negative 
reactance so therefore need not be considered. The overall impedance of such an antenna can 
be experimentally measured and matched to the desired values with the aid of a Smith chart 
and a network analyser.
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(a) Impedance due to  a 190 nH (b) Adding an 4 resistor in series (c) Adding a 652 pF capacitor in 
inductance parallel
Figure 4.3: Matching a loop antenna to 50 Q
Invented by Philip H. Smith in the 1940s, the Smith chart is a graphical tool that helps the 
designer achieve resonance and maximise efficiency by eliminating any impedance due to reactive 
components [52]. In the case of an NFC antenna on a contactless card, the load impedance is 
due to the internal circuit’s (chip) load resistance. This in turn affects two parameters, the 
transm itter supply current and the emitted RF power which both these parameters decrease 
with increasing load resistance. A load resistance of 40-50 is considered a good trade-off 
between both parameters [56]. The process of matching the impedance of a purely inductive 
typical NFC antenna is illustrated in Fig. 4.3. The blue fine in Fig. 4.3(a) illustrates how far 
off the current input impedance of this antenna is from the desired 50 fl mark which is at the 
centre of the chart. The pink fine indicates the impedance due to the current reactance of the 
circuit. The green semicircle illustrates the impact the addition of a —lOOfl to lOOQ reactance 
in parallel would have, with a positive value causing a move along the green semicircle in an 
anti-clockwise direction while the addition of negative reactance would cause a clockwise shift. 
Before nullifying the presence of any reactance, a small resistor is added in series to help bring 
the real impedance close to 50 fl, illustrated in Fig. 4.3(b). This is represented by the reduced 
radius of the green circle.
Caution needs to be taken not to add too much resistance as this would also introduce higher 
ohmic losses in the antenna and cause it to emit more heat instead of electromagnetic energy 
in the case of a transm itting antenna or increase the noise floor of a receiving antenna. Finally, 
Fig. 4.3(c) illustrates the load impedance of this antenna with a 406 pF capacitor added in 
parallel. This inclusion brings the pink line (effective impedance) of the antenna very close to
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the centre of the chart which is the 50 mark.
Inductive loop antennas used in NFC communication systems would normally be connected to 
a high load impedance in receive mode, so tha t a high Q is maintained, though for the purposes 
of the tests and measurements in this work, the loop is used as an eavesdropping antenna, which 
would be connected to RF equipment with a 50 H load. To ensure maximum power transfer it 
is also necessary to adjust the impedance of the loop antenna used for eavesdropping, which can 
be achieved using Smith chart matching. Similarly, the same must also be carried out for the 
NFC antenna used in transm it mode, which would normally be connected to a low impedance 
source, though for purposes of changing the transm itted H-field, it is necessary to use a power 
amplifier with 50 Q output impedance, which is standard for RF equipment.
4.1.2 Loop antennas and Q factor
Recent publications assume the inductance to be constant over frequency, though observations 
from measurement using a network analyser show that inductance will change at lower frequen­
cies. Fig. 4.4 shows measured results using a vector network analyser, where the inductance 
reduces to a constant value after about 1 MHz [56]. Where the frequency is low, the loop is ef­
fectively a short circuit and the inductance is expected to fall to zero. However, due to precision 
required for such a measurement, an accurate value of inductance cannot be resolved. From 
this point onwards, the inductance will be considered as frequency dependent and is therefore 
denoted L{ f )  or L{uj), where /  is the frequency and uj is the angular frequency equal to 27t/.
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This will become more important when the inductance values for a rogue antenna are consid­
ered. For any loop antenna to resonate, it is well known [49] that the parallel capacitance to be 
applied can be derived as:
^  =  (27t/ o) 2 L ( / o)
At the resonant frequency, the transceiver connected to the antenna has a load resistance, R l ,  
where in receive mode it will have the following system frequency response:
Vl 1
Mn 1 +  -  OJ^IC
(4.2)
This function is based on the ratio of the load voltage, W, across the load resistance and 
the input voltage effectively resulting from the current flowing in the loop antenna, Idn- One 
important point to realise from this is tha t maximum power transfer at the resonant frequency, 
üJo, will reduce to:
a . s ÿ  ( « .
Fin JVLwo
Thus, requiring a low inductance in order to maximise gain with as high load resistance as 
possible. The magnitude of this equation is also equal to the Q factor of the system, that 
depends on a low value of L and a high value of R l .  For transm it mode, the transfer function 
relating the voltage across the antenna. Va, which is now a reactive load, to the source voltage. 
Vs, tha t is now in parallel with R l ,  is given by:
—  = --------------    (4.4)
^  +  1
which by inspection shows that it will always have a value of 1 at the resonant frequency. The
magnitude of (4.4) gives the Q factor for the transm it mode. In the case of NFC operation
though, the Q factor is only relevant to receive mode where there is the need to maximise the
transfer of energy in order to power up the resistive load of the tag (microchip). Although when
this microchip ‘switches’ from receive to transmit mode for backscattering as described earlier
in Section 3.1.1, then (4.4) becomes relevant again. But, for the purposes of an eavesdropping
antenna, a low inductance and having a high load resistance at the transceiver is what needs to
be ensured.
4.1.3 Rogue antenna characteristics
A further point to consider, is the ease with which an attacker would be able to use a large 
metallic structure as a rogue antenna. Such an antenna could be connected to a transceiver
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Middle
Figure 4.5: Photograph showing the position on a trolley for measurement
device from which data could be eavesdropped. The case of a metallic trolley (for groceries or 
luggage) is a useful example given that such an item could be positioned in close proximity to a 
ticket machine in a railway station at which a contactless payment transaction is taking place. 
Characteristics tha t were measured from this example case are likely to be similar for other 
metallic structures of similar size.
The shopping trolley tested is illustrated in Fig. 4.5 where the trolley’s characteristics were 
measured at four separate locations. In all four cases, the ground connection to the network 
analyser (e.g. the outer part of the coaxial cable) was attached to the same point on the trolley, 
while the inner core of the coaxial cable was connected to the four different locations. The ‘Near 
End’ connection was made where the two ports were connected within close proximity to each 
other, the ‘Leg End’ connection was to the bottom of the leg of the trolley while the ‘Middle 
End’ and ‘Far End’ connections of the trolley were considering the middle point and furthest 
point at which a connection could be made. All connection points are illustrated in Fig. 4.5. In 
all cases, some extra wire was required to enable the connection to be made and in all cases the 
effect of this wire was not calibrated out of the measurement because it is an integral part of the 
rogue antenna. Note also that it was necessary to use a file to remove the waterproof coating 
where the connection was made so that a valid measurement could be taken. These four test 
positions therefore give a good overview of how the characteristic change when a large metallic
59
Scenario Inductance at 13.56 MHz /  //H Resistance at 13.56 MHz /  H
Near End 0.42 1.31
Middle End 1.42 18.48
Leg End 3.73 70.66
Far End 2.59 7.67
Table 4.1: Comparison of the inductance values at 13.56 MHz for the four test case scenarios 
structure is used.
It was found that for all the measurements taken, the resistance was not negligible unlike a typical 
NFC antenna, though in all cases the trolley was inductive. The inductance and resistance as 
a function of frequency are plotted in Fig. 4.6. At low frequencies the resistance is negligible 
since the characteristics are moving closer to that of what would be expected for an inductive 
H-antenna at DC conditions. As frequency increases to 13.5 MHz, the resistance begins to 
rise, and is particularly high for the ‘Leg End’ case while also the inductance is increasing. 
This is expected since the connection enables the highest possibility of parasitics to occur thus 
having significant impact on the input impedance at the trolley connectors. Provided that the 
connectors are kept close together, the load will remain inductive even when beyond a frequency 
of 20 MHz. Though the trolley is not a large loop antenna, such an antenna is a useful model 
case from which to justify that at such frequencies as 13.5 MHz, with a wavelength of 22.5 m, the 
size of the trolley will still have a loop size less than 0.15 A, where A is the wavelength [57]. Were 
significantly larger structures above 2 m in any dimension to be considered, a lossier antenna is 
likely to result due to increased internal resistance as shown in the case of the shopping trolley 
compared to a smaller loop antenna. The increased internal resistance would consequently cause 
higher ohmic losses and ultimately cause a much higher noise floor for the antenna which would 
make eavesdropping more difficult.
The values of inductance and resistance for the frequency of interest, 13.5 MHz, are shown in 
Table 4.1. Clearly the values deviate signihcantly, which will likewise influence the potential of 
the antenna if it were to be connected at different locations. A different analysis of the antenna’s 
transfer function in receive mode is therefore necessary and a modified circuit diagram is shown 
in Fig. 4.7. In this case, the trolley has inductance, Lxifo),  with a resistance, Rxifo) ,  both 
of which are dependent on frequency. Given that it is only of interest to consider the rogue
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Figure 4.7: New circuit representation for a trolley or large metallic object being applied as a 
rogue antenna
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antenna in receive mode, the ratio of load voltage to input voltage can now be derived with:
Y k  = __________________ -__________________  (4 5)
Mn 1 +  +  ju C R ri io )  +  -  u^LC
Note that (4.5) reduces to the original one when R t  is zero. Also at the resonant frequency, the 
following is true since uj becomes ujq:
R lVl
Mr. j i L r M + R T R L C )  ^
y Lj'{c^ o)C
(4.6)
Therefore a high value of R l would still be desirable at the receiver though clearly high values 
of R t  are going to be a disadvantage and effectively act as a damper to the resonant system. 
To determine the level of Q tha t would be attainable by a rogue antenna, the values of L r i f )  
and R r i f )  have been analysed using (4.5) from which a transfer function versus frequency for 
the four measurement cases can be output. The data output from this is shown in Fig. 4.8 
where a load resistance of 1000 was chosen and for each of the four cases the capacitance was 
calculated corresponding to the inductances at 13.5 MHz shown in Table 4.1. The dependence 
of L r i f )  and Rr { f )  on frequency will inevitably have an impact on the Q factor, while also 
higher values will degrade the system gain. Clearly the Q is significantly lower for measurements 
at locations other than the Near End scenario. Even though a high Q can be obtained using 
a small parallel capacitor (which could be fine-tuned as a variable capacitor) the trolley does 
not by any means represent an ideal loop antenna. In fact, the feed-in point has a shorting 
line across it, which means tha t inevitably the current distribution will be concentrated largely 
around the feed. Given tha t the feed is still inductive and of low resistance, this results in high
Q.
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4.1.4 Feasibility of building a rogue antenna
This chapter has identified that connecting a receiver with high resistance to a metallic structure 
such as a shopping trolley will provide a high Q and as such if the receiver should be connected 
anywhere, the two ports should be in close proximity. To the attacker, this is a huge advantage 
because they will have the ability to discreetly connect their receiver to a metallic structure 
using crocodile clips or other means and have the highest chances of achieving eavesdropping. 
Furthermore, it will only require them to adjust a variable capacitor connected in parallel so 
as to tune the rogue antenna from which a simple device could measure a suitably large Q. A 
large load resistance has been assumed during the work carried out as part of this thesis because 
an operational amplifier can be readily used at 13.5 MHz, which is assumed to have high input 
impedance tha t can be considered a virtual ground [53]. Therefore an attacker has the means 
to buy low cost equipment to act as an RF receiver, from which the carrier can be demodulated 
and then processed at baseband with relatively low cost electronics that can be held within a 
small rucksack.
Though it would be relatively simple to create the rogue antenna, its reliability is still subject to 
the efficiency it will have once deployed. Given the high gain of operational amplifiers, however, 
this lack of efficiency can still be compensated. There are only two major disadvantages that 
could create difficulty with regards to eavesdropping:
• The path loss at this frequency and using such antennas is proportional to where r is 
the distance from the source [49]. Therefore the received power will decay rapidly, which 
would be problematic when using a rogue antenna tha t is not within a few metres since 
the allowed transm itted power would begin to hit the noise floor at any further distances.
• The trolley itself is susceptible to noise, due to the internal resistance that results from the 
fact that it is in essence a large metallic structure. In comparison, a typical H-loop antenna 
was found experimentally earlier in this chapter to have negligible internal resistance. 
The presence of internal resistance could result in a significantly weaker SNR for the 
eavesdropping system. This will be partially the case where the rogue antenna is in the 
vicinity of other electrical equipment or when other signals at the frequency of interest 
(13.56 MHz) are broadcast, such as short wave amateur radio stations.
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4.2 C onclusions
This chapter has introduced antenna design principles for NFC systems. The underlying theory 
behind small loop antennas currently being used in contactless cards and mobile phones has 
been examined. Additionally, measurements were conducted and found the inductance of such 
antennas to change at low frequencies (under 1 MHz), contrary to what had been published 
until recently. For an NFC antenna operating in receiver mode the value of inductance is of 
major concern as it is one of the two values contributing to a high Q factor, along with the load 
impedance.
Based on the studied design principles, this chapter also presented how a shopping trolley could 
be modified to act as an eavesdropping antenna. Measurements were taken to study the Q factor 
of such an antenna over the operating bandwidth. The Q factor of the trolley was measured 
experimentally and found to be equal to 14. This was a high enough value to allow a wide enough 
bandwidth. Further tuning of the capacitor - resistor matching circuit shown in Appendix A, 
could allow higher Q factors and consequently increase the amount of power received by the 
trolley when at resonance. In comparison, a typical NFC antenna used either in a contactless 
card or NFC device would have a Q factor of 30-80 [47]. In comparison, Hancke [30] used a 10 cm 
radius loop antenna with capacitive matching (like the work presented in this chapter) resulting 
in a Q factor of 5. It seems to be a pattern that rogue eavesdropping antennas have significantly 
lower Q factors than commercial contactless products. Rogue antennas do not require such high 
Q factors since they can be much larger in radius than the antennas found on contactless cards 
and NFC devices. However, for the purpose of eavesdropping an attacker should still aim to get 
as high Q factor as possible to maximise the coupling of energy.
An element that is crucial to make the shopping trolley appealing to an eavesdropper, besides 
its inconspicuous nature, is the connection point dependence when it comes to its internal 
resistance and inductance. When such connection points are kept as short as possible non only 
the internal resistance and inductance are minimised but also the usability of the trolley as an 
antenna is increased. This is achieved by enabling the attacker to easily and discreetly connect 
his communications receiver to the antenna. A further improvement that could be investigated 
is the potential use of the trolley as an antenna array. This could be achieved due to the 
construction of the trolley, using it as an array of small diameter loops rather than a single large 
loop. Alternatively, the structure of the trolley could be altered (by cutting it) to increase the
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size of the resulting loops. Either approach could yield an improvement in received signal power, 
but the extent remains to be investigated.
Additionally, the shopping trolley was found to benefit from a high load impedance that could be 
offered by a receiver amplifier which is a relatively simple and low cost component. Contrary to 
common practise, it was also suggested that such an eavesdropping antenna should be matched 
to this high load impedance in order to maximise its performance and not to the 50 0  when 
transmission cables are used.
However, the susceptibility that such an eavesdropping system has to background noise is likely 
to be the highest obstacle to overcome for a successful eavesdrop. In the next chapter, path loss 
measurements over a number of distances and varied magnetic fields were conducted with the 
rogue antennas including the shopping trolley design presented here in order to determine the 
extent to which potential susceptibility to background noise could reduce their effectiveness.
A publication, 'On the design of NFC antennas for contactless payment applications’, was pre­
sented at the European Conference of Antennas and Propagation (EUCAP) in April 2011 con­
taining the analysis carried out on the antennas discussed in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
Measuring Magnetic Fields Using 
Concealable Antennas
Although large metallic structures were found in previous chapters to be potentially usable 
eavesdropping antennas, their susceptibility to noise remains a big question mark. Additionally, 
even though a high load impedance than can be provided by a component such as an op-amp 
and result in relatively high Q factors, caution needs to be taken while designing such rogue 
antennas in order to ensure that the high Q factor does not narrow the effective bandwidth too 
much and not cover the 1.7 MHz bandwidth used by NFC systems.
Results presented in this chapter evaluate the eavesdropping distance achievable by rogue an­
tennas including the shopping trolley discussed in the previous chapter, a small loop H-antenna 
and quarter wavelength wire antenna. In recently published work discussed during the literature 
review, eavesdropping distances were evaluated based on whatever magnetic field the contactless 
target at the disposal of the researchers was emitting. Given the broad range (1.5-7.5 A m"^) 
of magnetic field strength specified in the ISO 14443 standard, eavesdropping distance could 
vary significantly and the work presented here provides a more complete evaluation of what is 
possible when it comes to eavesdropping a contactless transaction.
The results presented in this chapter evaluate the eavesdropping distance achievable for H-fields 
between 0.5 A m“  ^ and 7.5A m ~k For transmission of a controlled H-field, a H-loop NFC 
antenna was designed and used as part of the transm itter. The results are divided into two 
parts, the first set of measurements verify the expected path loss using a spectrum analyser 
and different antenna designs, while the second set of results evaluate the distance at which a
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A n tenna  Coil
Figure 5.1: Tuning of an NFC antenna for measurement
Type A NFC signal using OOK modulation can be successfully demodulated and viewed on an 
oscilloscope.
5.1 M agnetic F ields from  th e  T ransm itter P oin t o f V iew
5.1.1 M easurem ent set - up
An NFC antenna to be used both for transmission and reception, was set up as a circular coil 
antenna of one turn with a radius, rant, of 1.5cm. This length was chosen through practical 
measurements, in order to allow a wide enough bandwidth. This resulted in a low inductance 
antenna of 0.3 pH, which cannot be easily matched by reactive components alone and provide 
a wide bandwidth due to the high Q factor such a circuit creates. As shown in the previous 
chapter, a high Q depends on high load resistance, inductance could be of any value but it was 
chosen to be kept low for the benefit of good reception. Therefore a small resistance of 10 O was 
placed in series with the inductive antenna as illustrated in Fig. 5.1, such that by using a Smith 
Chart in a similar fashion to Section 4.1.1, it was possible to suitably match the input to 50 
at 13.56 MHz using a parallel capacitance of 420 pF, giving a return loss of greater than 10 dB 
and a sufficient bandwidth. The reason why 50 was the chosen matching impedance was to 
maximise the power transfer from the transm itting and receiving ends of the system since an 
RF amplifier with a 50 O impedance was used for transmission. The value of the series resistor 
was kept to a minimum in order that the power it dissipates as heat by being in series with the 
inductor is minimised. A typical transm itter antenna used for NFC purposes will not employ any 
series resistors, but instead assume a purely inductive load [47, 49]. A low value of inductance is 
preferred as this will keep inductive reactance, X l :  low and consequently maximise the flow of
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Figure 5.2: Photograph of the measurement set-up and eavesdropper wearing a rogue antenna
current and radiated power by the antenna. Calculating the maximum value of current flowing 
in a purely inductive load is not simple as it requires knowledge of the Root Mean Square (RMS) 
value of the AC voltage across the inductive load. By including a small series resistor it enabled 
the inductive loop antenna to easily be matched to the 50 ft impedance of the transm itting power 
amplifier and helped with the calculation of the current flow in the resulting resistor-inductor 
series circuit.
W ith knowledge of the loss caused by the introduction of the series resistance at 13.56 MHz, 
which was calculated with simple Ohms law calculations to be less than 1 dB and thus negligible, 
it is possible to ascertain the power and hence maximum current, I  in the H-antenna, knowing 
the inductance and frequency from which the magnetic H-field can be calculated by [58]:
During the measurements, sufficient current was induced in the H-antenna using a signal gener­
ator and power amplifier (with pad attenuators for protection) in order to achieve fields up to
7.5 A m “ .^ The first rogue antenna consisted of a 5m wire, comparable to a quarter wavelength 
at 13.56 MHz, which was placed over the eavesdropper’s body as illustrated in Fig. 5.2 and con­
nected to a hand-held spectrum analyser. It is useful to study the vulnerability tha t such an 
antenna has with regards to de-tuning in different scenarios. Fig. 5.3 illustrates such cases where 
the wire was mounted onto the body in five different ways, then secondly it was mounted to 
a rucksack in another five ways while finally it was laid straight on the floor in five different 
positions to evaluate how the reflection coefficient. S u ,  measured with a network analyser as 
discussed earlier in Section 3.4.1.2, changes. Clearly, it can be seen that in the case of the
Reflection Coefficient of a 5m wire
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of the reflection coefficient, S'il of a 5 m wire on the body, a rucksack 
and laid on the ground
rucksack, the antenna is subject to de-tuning and it is hard to keep its resonant frequency at a 
constant position. However, in the case where the antenna is laid on the ground and round the 
body, there is little difference and thus the wire antenna can be considered to be more reliable 
when used in such a way. Though the antenna is not tuned to 13.56 MHz for the ground case, 
a shorter wire could easily rectify this problem though it is not so practical to have a 5m long 
wire placed along the ground for eavesdropping purposes. The antenna being wrapped round 
the body of an eavesdropper is a more practical scenario where the tuning can be maintained, 
though undoubtedly efficiency will be compromised [49] due to the water content of the body 
which makes it act like a capacitor, increasing the overall capacitance of the antenna and as a 
result de-tune the antenna.
The second rogue antenna was that of a shopping trolley, which could represent any large metallic 
structure in proximity to a contactless payment terminal such as a basket or shelving. Whatever 
the structure of the trolley, a matching circuit with a resistor and a capacitor such as that in 
Fig. 5.1 can be connected to two points on the shopping trolley in close proximity. Previous 
measurements showed that the trolley is most inductive at such a point [59]. The inductance 
was, however, higher at 0.5 pH compared to the loop antenna, thus requiring a resistance of 30 fl 
and capacitance of 180 pF to get close to the required impedance match. However, this will of
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Figure 5.4: Results comparing the propagation range against transm itted H-field using a 5m 
wire as rogue antenna
course bring a further receiving loss to the antenna with the higher resistance required, which 
will be around 4dB. Finally the third antenna used more for purposes of comparison in the 
second set of tests, was another inductive loop antenna similar to the one used as the transmit 
antenna.
5.2 P a th  Loss M easurem ents
The first set of path loss measurements are presented in Fig. 5.4 using a rogue antenna wrapped 
around the body. These results show how the received power from the spectrum analyser in 
dBm  changes over distance when comparing 0.5A m “ ,^ 1.5A m “  ^ and 7.5A m “ .^ Obviously 
for lower fields, the measured power levels fall below the noise floor of the spectrum analyser at 
a large distance. A minimal resolution bandwidth was also used in order to ensure maximum 
dynamic range of the measurements. A —111.9dBm  noise floor is also inserted as a base line 
since it is assumed that for NFC, with two subcarriers 847 kHz either side of the 13.56 MHz 
carrier, tha t an eavesdropper would require a system bandwidth of approximately 1.7 MHz with 
such minimum noise floor. It should be noted however, tha t in practice the noise floor of any 
receiver will be higher than this, not only due to noise in the radio and the noise figure of the 
receiver amplifier, but other background noise radiated by nearby electrical devices and also
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broadcast signals in the HF band [59]. The degree of such interference is highly dependent on 
location.
Concentrating on the 0.5 A m“  ^ results, plotted in Fig. 5.5, further measurements are taken 
where they compare the power received versus distance but at different angles from the antenna, 
being 0° when directly in front of the loop of the H-antenna, at 45° and 90° where it is tangential 
to the loop. Clearly, there is little change in the received power. Thus at any radius away from 
the H-antenna, the power decays with a ^  proportionality as would be expected theoretically 
[58], where r  is the distance from the loop.
Similar measurements were carried out using a shopping trolley, though in this case, only H-fields 
of 0.5 A m " \  1.5 A m“  ^ and 4.5 A m“  ^ were possible to carry out due to limitations of the 
equipment used. Fig. 5.6 shows the results of the measurements taken, where for 4.5 A m“ ,^ the 
measurement was taken two times with the front of the trolley (where it was connected to the 
spectrum analyser) facing the loop antenna, while in the second case the side of the trolley was 
facing the transm itting loop antenna. Measurements were out of dynamic range where the back 
of the trolley was facing the loop antenna. For 0.5 A m“  ^ and 1.5 A m“  ^ measurements to the 
side of the trolley were excluded because the received signals were so weak that they were out 
of dynamic range of the measuring equipment to obtain a meaningful set of results. For the
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Figure 5.6: Comparison of path loss for measurements taken using a shopping trolley
4.5 A m“  ^ measurements, orientation of the trolley has little effect, while reducing the H-field to 
0.5 A m“  ^ reduces the received power by as much as 20 dB.
5.3 M easurem ents w ith  a D em odulator
The second set of measurements taken as part of this chapter, took a full evaluation of the dis­
tance at which a Type A NFC device communicating using OOK modulation of a subcarrier at a 
data rate of 106 kbps could be eavesdropped and recovered on an oscilloscope. The methodology 
used for the evaluation of eavesdropping success (recovery on an oscilloscope) is similar to what 
was done is recently published work, but with large, high gain and high directivity antennas 
[27].
In order to emulate the behaviour of an NFC device as closely as possible, a square wave 
at 108 kHz from a signal generator was used to modulate the 13.56 MHz carrier. Due to the 
equipment available at the time this experiment was conducted, it was not possible to implement 
the subcarrier modulation a Type A tag would normally use to respond to a reader. Regardless 
though, the use or not of subcarrier modulation does not impact the eavesdropping distance 
that can be achieved.
The measurement set-up is shown in Fig. 5.7, where a rogue antenna (a shopping trolley in
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Figure 5.7: Diagram of the measurement set-up for measuring the range at which a Type A 
NFC signal can be successfully demodulated
the case illustrated) is matched to 50 D, using the same method used with the inductive loop 
described in Section 5.1.1, and connected to a low noise amplifier (to maximise SNR) followed by 
an operational filter and a filter bank, discussed in Section 3.5.2, within the 1.7 MHz bandwidth 
used in NFC. A peak detector then acts as the demodulator in the case of OOK modulation 
tha t is used in Type A systems. The operational amplifier was only required for purposes of 
compensating out losses in the filter and increasing the signal to a level detectable by the peak 
detector.
This form of demodulator was chosen as it will result in the least amount of additional noise, 
which would otherwise occur from demodulation using a mixer, where the local oscillator (co­
herent receiver) will have additional phase noise. Such a coherent receiver in theory could offer 
superior performance [34] but its implementation is not straightforward while increasing the 
overall system complexity and cost, making it an unrealistic choice for the average attacker. 
The approach described here could be much more easily implemented. In carrying out the mea­
surements, the output observed on the oscilloscope was similar to those shown in Fig. 5.8(a) 
where the output of the peak detector can be identified to detect the square wave rising from 0 
to 1, as would be expected in OOK. In the case where the rogue antenna was moved too far away 
from the transm itting loop antenna, only the noise floor of the eavesdropping antenna could be 
observed as illustrated in Fig. 5.8(b). The distance at which this behaviour was first observed, 
was taken as the maximum eavesdropping distance.
The measurement was carried out for three different values of transm itted magnetic H-field,
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(a) Recoverable signal (b) Noisy signal
Figure 5.8: Illustration of the oscilloscope output
A ntenna 0 .5A m   ^ Dist(m) 1.5A m   ^ Dist(m) 4 .5 A m   ^ Dist(m) Background noise(dB m)
Trolley 0.2 0.3 0.4 -64.0
W ire - - - -56.5
Loop 0.5 0.7 0.9 -91.2
Table 5.1: Comparison of the measurement ranges where a demodulated square wave could be 
recovered and the background noise received by each antenna
0.5 A m “ ,^ 1.5 A m “  ^ and 4.5 A m “  ^ with the wire antenna around a body, the shopping trolley 
and another inductive loop all directly facing the transm itting loop. The second inductive loop 
was identical with the transm itting antenna. In Table 5.1 the distances at which detection failed 
by observing the output at the oscilloscope are listed. In the case of the wire antenna there was 
no success in obtaining any measurements at such bandwidths due to the body causing coupling 
to the ground, from which high background noise from the surrounding environment (—56.5 dB m 
as measured by the spectrum analyser) was significantly higher than what was detected from 
the transm itting loop and thus no deducible signal could be output to the oscilloscope.
The trolley was also subject to significant background noise but with an amplitude lower by 
almost 8 dBm  than the case of the wire around the body (—64dBm). Compared to the noise 
figure of the inductive loop (-91.2 dBm) this is still a high noise level but this improvement of 
just 8 dBm , made it possible to successfully eavesdrop all attem pted transmissions, unlike the 
case with the wire antenna, but at much reduced distances due to the still high background noise. 
Observing the measurements taken by the loop antenna, distances beyond 0.5 m were possible 
to detect. Due to the significantly greater efficiency of the antenna, the background noise was 
significantly lower down at —91.2dBm  and since the transm itting loop and receiving loop were 
aligned, the signal to interference ratio compared to the other two antennas was substantially
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higher, thus allowing a longer detection range. It should be noted that these measurements were 
carried out in a laboratory environment, which was subject to a range of background radiation 
both from broadcast signals in the HF band but also emissions from electrical appliances such 
as computers that were in the vicinity.
Therefore in cases where background radiation is likely to be significantly lower (such as in 
underground locations) the higher efficiency of the other two antennas will be subject to a lower 
signal to noise ratio and the possibility of a longer measurement range. However, the results 
clarify that for retail outlets often based on ground level, the background radiation is high 
enough that it will make eavesdropping from contactless payment terminals, or interrogation 
from a nearby distance, to be only possible at distances up to 0.5 m using practical antennas 
and radio apparatus.
5.4 C onclusions
Results presented in this chapter show the first analysis of the propagation range of H-fields 
from NFC H-antennas using realistic designs of rogue antenna for eavesdropping, including a 
shopping trolley, small loop antenna and quarter wavelength piece of wire. A novel approach 
of measuring the magnetic field strength emitted by a transm itter antenna was also introduced, 
through the inclusion of a small series resistance in the overall impedance of the transmitter. 
This makes calculating the maximum flow of current easier for the designer, which in turn can 
be used to compute the value of the transm itted H-field. The conventional way of measuring 
magnetic field strength is through the use of magnetometers, which are expensive to purchase 
and non-trivial to build as they require precise calibration in order to give accurate readings. On 
the other hand, the indirect measurement approach presented in this chapter provides a simpler 
alternative that anyone could use. It would be of interest to experimentally compare the readings 
obtained through this approach to those obtained with a magnetometer. The performance of 
the proposed rogue antennas was evaluated in terms of propagation range measurements not 
only with varying H-fields, but also at various angles to the transmitter.
The practical work that led to these results was necessary due to the nature of the antennas 
that were used. The ^  path loss relationship between received signal power and distance is 
well established, but the theoretical result cannot account for the nature of niche antennas 
like modified metallic structures with their own internal resistance. This internal resistance will
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impact the amount of power received at the eavesdropping antenna. However, the increased loop 
size offered by the shopping trolley and the high Q factor of the small loop antenna could offset 
these ohmic losses. The results presented in this chapter show that practical eavesdropping 
antenna designs can get very close to the theoretical results. The quarter - wavelength wire 
remains an interesting antenna design although the scenarios were it could be used discreetly 
are limited. The measurements presented in this chapter show that wrapping such an antenna 
around the human body causes it to de-tune and reduce its overall efficiency. This effect is 
caused by the high water content of the human body which introduces additional capacitance to 
the wire antenna. Furthermore, we found that additional noise was being coupled through the 
ground. This explains why placing the antenna straight on the floor, even though it performed 
better, is not ideal as it will still couple the ground noise. A possible solution to this problem 
would be for the attacker to suspend such an antenna in air, but this would make its practical 
use more difficult.
Finally, an evaluation of eavesdropping distance in terms of signal recovery on an oscilloscope 
was also presented. Carried out using a demodulator consisting of low cost and readily available 
electronics with such an arrangement making it an ideal choice for building an inconspicuous 
eavesdropper. The next chapter will discuss and analyse the implementation of the complete 
eavesdropping system.
These results are limited to scenarios above or on ground level where the eavesdropper is sub­
jected to high levels of background noise from nearby electrical appliances or HF broadcast 
signals. Clearly, the presence of background noise is a good counter measure to prevent interro­
gation and eavesdropping of NFC devices, though it is certain that the risk is higher from more 
secluded locations, where there is less availability of background noise.
The eavesdropping receiver could be further improved to reduce its susceptibility to background 
noise. For example, printed circuit antennas are known to be more efficient (higher coupling of 
energy from transm itter to receiver) than the loop antenna design used in this chapter. Addi­
tionally, the LNA used in the receiver has a noise figure of 3dB. As discussed in Section 3.5.1, 
the noise introduced by the LNA is the major contributor to the receiver’s overall noise. It is 
possible to obtain a lower LNA with a noise figure of 0.5 dB, at a higher expense than the one 
we used. However, an improvement of nearly 3 dB to the overall SNR though would in theory 
offer a 25% increase in distance for the same BER.
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A publication, ‘Evaluating the Eavesdropping Range of Varying Magnetic Eield Strengths in 
NFC Standards’, was presented at the International Conference of Antennas and Propagation 
(EUCAP) in April 2013 containing the measurements and analysis carried out in this chapter.
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Chapter 6
Eavesdropping Near Field 
Communications: A Quantitative 
Analysis
Based on the propagation measurements and initial results from an attem pt to recover eaves­
dropped communication with a low cost demodulator, it was decided that the rogue antenna 
designs most likely to be successful were the modified shopping trolley and small loop H-antenna. 
The measurements obtained with these antennas were the first published research to present 
eavesdropping results with a range of magnetic field strengths, as earlier research relied on 
whatever field the eavesdropped device was emitting. The magnetic field strength was con­
trolled through the supply current to the transm itting antenna using an uncommon approach of 
including a series resistor to the antenna circuit as explained in the previous chapter. Eavesdrop­
ping at a particular distance given a magnetic field was deemed successful based on whether the 
recovered signal on an oscilloscope screen was recoverable with a naked eye. This is the same 
methodology tha t was used in previously published work to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
tested eavesdropping system. This approach however, does not provide reliable and convincing 
results.
This chapter presents the first quantitative analysis, in terms of Frame Error Rates (FER), of an 
inconspicuous and low cost eavesdropping system over a range of distances and magnetic field 
strengths. An NEC compatible transm itter device was assembled that allowed the transmission 
of an appropriately long, randomly generated (but known) sequence in order to compute the FER
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at the eavesdropping end. A novel software based receiver was also designed and implemented 
tha t allows the system to be reliably used regardless of the received SNR.
All measurements presented were taken in an anechoic chamber. Background noise was found 
in the previous chapter to be a key factor affecting the performance of the proposed discreet 
rogue antenna designs therefore experimenting in an anechoic chamber gives optimal results for 
the system under investigation.
6.1 T ransm itter D esign
6.1.1 M ode of operation
An NFC device can operate in three modes:
• Peer-to-Peer mode as specified in ISO 18092 where such devices can exchange data files
(e.g. images) or set-up a wireless link between them [51].
• Proximity Coupling Device (PCD) mode where the NFC device is acting as the reader that 
generates the electromagnetic field required to power passive transponders (/c =  13.56 
MHz) which in turn respond by load modulating the carrier signal with a A =  ^  =  847 
kHz subcarrier. In PCD mode an NFC device is able to read passive poster tags [17] or 
contactless smartcards.
• Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (PICC) mode where the NFC device emulates the 
behaviour of a Type A contactless smartcard. Type B is also supported but no such NFC
devices were readily available at the time this work was carried out.
For the purpose of the work presented in this chapter emphasis was placed on PICC mode as 
this is the de-facto mode for contactless payments used today on the high street. From this point 
forward and for the remainder of this chapter, the ‘standard’ refers to the ISO 14443 standard 
and ‘PICC’ applies to both contactless smartcards and NFC devices operating in PICC mode.
6.1.2 Frame structure
In order to be able to compute the FER of an eavesdropped transmission, the transm itted data 
needs to be known at the receiving end. To accomplish this, standard compliant frames were
79
generated in software. This approach was chosen to ensure full control over the transm itted 
data as in the case where a commercial NFC device was used there would be no control over 
what was being transm itted as this would be dependant on whatever transaction was being 
carried out. The standard states that for data exchange between a reader and a PICC, frames 
referred to as ‘standard frames’ are used. These frames are longer than the ‘short frames’ used 
to initiate and establish communication. Only PICC ‘standard frames’ were transm itted during 
the measurements that were taken since the aim of these measurements was to analyse the 
eavesdropping of uplink communication (PICC to PCD) as this is more likely to contain the 
potentially sensitive information an eavesdropper would be after [60]. Each ‘standard frame’ 
consists of 9n bits (8 data +  1 parity bit for each of n bytes) along with the Start of Frame 
(SOF) and End of Frame (EOF) bits. SOF is a Manchester encoded binary ‘1’ and the EOF is 
specified as an unmodulated carrier with a duration equal to 9.44 ps.
After close examination of the log file of a typical contactless transaction supplied by Consult 
Hyperion [61] for the purpose of these experiments, it was found that the majority of ‘standard 
frames’ were between 40 and 80 bytes long. Since the standard does not enforce a limit on the 
maximum length of this type of frame and that the the information being exchanged during 
a payment can vary from scheme to scheme (e.g. VISA or Mastercard), for these reasons a 
‘standard frame’ size of 60 bytes (the average size based on what was observed in the log file) 
was used.
6.1.3 Encoding and m odulation
A random binary sequence was generated and Manchester encoded as per standard guidelines 
shown in Table 6.1. The 847 kHz subcarrier was generated in software using an external trigger 
signal at 1.7 MHz. This frequency was chosen to ensure we would have at least two samples for 
each subcarrier cycle. The effect of various sampling rates, is illustrated in Fig. 6.1. A sampling 
rate at twice the frequency of interest (Nyquist sampling rate) does not offer the highest level of 
detail in the sampled signal but it does allow accurate construction and reconstruction (at the 
receiver) of the signal to be transm itted. This sampling frequency resulted in each modulated bit 
consisting of 16 samples and having a duration of 9.41 ps. The standard specifies the bit duration 
as ^  and abbreviates it to 9.4 ps. The process of encoding the baseband signal and then OOK 
modulating it on the subcarrier is illustrated in Fig. 6.2. At the end of each frame an extra 160
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Figure 6.1: Sampling a 40 Hz sinusoidal signal at various sampling frequencies
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Table 6.1: ISO 14443 Type A modulation
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Figure 6.2: A sequence of 5 bits, Manchester encoded and then loaded onto the 847 kHz subcar­
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Figure 6.3: Transition between two PICC frames
guard samples, equivalent to 94.1 ps, were inserted. This was done to meet the requirement of 
a t least 86.4 ps between the last transm itted PICC frame and the next PCD response, with the 
carrier field being on for the whole duration [48]. The transition delay between two PICC frames 
transm itted consecutively is illustrated in Fig. 6.3. For the transmission and reception of the 
generated frames, the arrangement shown in Fig. 6.4 was used. The subcarrier modulated output 
of the Data Acquisition (DAQ) card was passed to an In-phase /  quadrature (IQ) modulator for 
modulation with the carrier signal at 13.56 MHz [62]. An attenuator in-between was used to 
control the baseband voltage at the input of the modulator. A signal generator was used to 
generate the 13.56 MHz sinusoidal carrier and the resulting modulation was 100% ASK (OOK). 
The same H-antenna used for transmission in the previous chapter was used again with the same 
method of controlling the strength of the radiated magnetic field and impedance matching as 
described in Section 5.1.1. The antenna’s resonant frequency was at 13.56 MHz with a bandwidth 
of 2 MHz to include the modulation sidebands.
6.2 D em od u lation  and D a ta  A cquisition
The same set-up presented in Section 5.3 was used for the demodulation of the eavesdropped 
data. The output of the peak detector was captured on the analogue input of the DAQ card 
at 1.7 MHz since this was the highest frequency the DAQ card was capable of capturing at.
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Figure 6.4; Transmitter and receiver arrangement
Decoding of the eavesdropped data was done offline. The driving idea for this decision was that 
an attacker would capture a number of transactions and then decode them at a later stage.
Using equipment that could allow higher speed sampling, would have offered a higher resolution 
of the captured samples but such equipment is prohibitively expensive for the average attacker 
not only in terms of purchasing but also in terms of data storage and processing cost. For 
example, Hancke in [32] used a (coherent) hardware receiver which mixed the eavesdropped 
signal up to 30 MHz which was then captured at 100 MS/s for just 320 ms. The equipment that 
was used to enable this is neither compact nor portable. In order to get accurate error rates, 
a long series of frames had to be transmitted. If the same approach as Hancke was used at 
100 MS/s with 16-bit sampling, this would require approximately 112 GIB of storage. Thus by 
implementing a non-coherent receiver in the form of a logarithmic amplifier acting as a peak 
detector, as shown in Section 5.3, these limitations were overcome.
6.3 Fram e Synchronisation  and D ecod in g
The sampled output of the peak detector given a high SNR is illustrated in Fig. 6.5. As the 
eavesdropping distance gets longer or background interference gets stronger the SNR will reach a 
point where the captured samples can no longer be decoded without further software processing
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Figure 6.6: Variance smoothing and threshold
6.3.1 Prelim inary frame synchronisation
The top half of Fig. 6.6 shows the effect noise has on the transm itted data. The vertical line 
indicates the start of a frame, with anything before tha t being just an unmodulated 13.56 MFlz 
carrier signal corrupted by noise, emulating the PCD’s magnetic field. In order to minimise the 
impact of noise on synchronisation and consequently data recovery, the variance of the captured
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Figure 6.7: Average DC levels for AWGN and Manchester encoded captures samples
samples was used as a way of achieving frame synchronisation. The nature of Manchester 
encoding and Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) ensures that the variance of the carrier 
signal loaded with an encoded subcarrier will always be higher than that of the carrier corrupted 
by AWGN. This due to the fact tha t Manchester code will always yield an almost average DC 
level of 50% while AWGN will yield a zero mean, as illustrated in Fig. 6.7 [50]. Therefore the 
‘deeper’ state transitions that occur in Manchester code will cause a higher overall variance.
A sliding window with a length of 32 samples (2 bits) was used to compute the variance of the 
captured samples. The reason this particular size was chosen is as follows: A binary sequence is 
first Manchester encoded and then modulated with the 847 kHz subcarrier. Due to the nature 
of Manchester encoding, a sequence of ‘1 0’ or ‘0 F will always cause a dip in variance after 
Manchester encoding because of the prolonged lack of state transitions since ‘1 0’ is encoded —)■ ‘1 
0 0 1’ and ‘0 1’ is encoded —> ‘0 1 1 0 ’. W ith a sliding window of 16 samples during the occurrence 
of these two sequences the variance drops to a minimum between samples 0-16 and 64-80 falsely 
indicating a start /  end of a frame. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.8. The reason why a window size 
of 32 works best is because of the sample size it provides. Since the biggest dip in variance will 
be caused by two consecutive binary bits, their length is the highest tha t should be processed. 
Fig. 6.9 illustrates the variance of the same binary sequence from Fig. 6.8 with an extra window
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length of 48 samples. While a window size of 16 suffered from not capturing enough, a window 
of 48 captures too much, the extra bit it includes ‘corrupts’ the variance of the previous two 
bits. This ‘corruption’ can be seen again between samples 64-80, where it is annotated causing 
another dip in variance. This approach provides preliminary frame synchronisation by allowing 
detection of the sample positions where a drop in variance above or below a certain threshold 
value occurs. This threshold, p, is defined as a percentage of Uyar, given by:
f h v  " F  f l v
(6 .1)
with fhv being the most frequent high variance value and fi^ being the most frequent low 
variance value. Crossing p signals the start /  end of a frame. The most frequent values (high 
and low) were obtained through a histogram plot of all the possible amplitude states that were 
found in the captured samples from each eavesdropped transmission. Instead of simply selecting 
the maximum and minimum amplitudes, the histogram approach was used to account for noise 
corruption and therefore provide more reliable results.
6.3.2 R obust frame synchronisation
Initially p =  50% was used for the processing of captures with high SNR since this was the 
right in the middle of a given variance threshold. This value of p though soon turned out to be 
inadequate. The lower half of Fig. 6.6 illustrates the problem that was faced. When the SNR
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Figure 6.9: Three different window sizes, 16, 32 and 48 for the binary data of Fig. 6.8
becomes low enough the variance of the captured samples can still falsely dip below a previously 
working threshold.
A value of p =  60% was chosen because after some preliminary testing, it was found to be 
performing consistently well for a variety of SNRs. In this example, data starts at sample 60 
and continues until the end of the plot. In order to solve this problem of false dipping, Gaussian 
smoothing was applied to the variance curve. The degree of smoothing was determined by, cr, 
the standard deviation for the Gaussian kernel. The lower half of Fig. 6.6 illustrates the effect 
of different a values. W ith no smoothing {a =  0) the variance curve crosses p between samples 
80-96 and 130-150 causing the software to interpret this as 3 different frames when only one was 
transmitted. With cr =  10 the variance curve stays above p. Because of the length of the sliding 
window being equal to 32 samples (2 bits) the variance curves cross the threshold 16 samples (1 
bit) earlier than where they should had done but since this is a constant difference it is easily 
addressed by adding an offset of 16 samples to the variance detected frame start positions. In 
the case of cr =  40, this applies excessive smoothing causing the variance curve to never fall 
below the value of p and consequently miss the start of a frame.
Robust frame synchronisation is achieved with a combination of cross correlation and frame 
length check. Frames start with a set SOF sequence and end with a EOF sequence as defined 
in the standard. The SOF being a Manchester encoded binary ‘1’ would cause the variance to
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rise and cross p. This position plus 16 samples (the offset mentioned earlier due to the chosen 
window size) gives the SOF position. The EOF, being an unmodulated carrier, is a bit trickier to 
accurately detect because it will have the same variance as the samples captured after the EOF 
(13.56 MHz carrier corrupted by noise) since the carrier signal remains present for the duration 
of a contactless transaction even when the PICC is not transmitting.
For this reason a frame length check is used. According to the standard, the shortest possible 
frame is a ‘short frame’ consisting of seven data bits and the SOF /  EOF markers. Civen a 
sampling rate of 1.7 MHz, such a frame would have a length of 144 samples. But a ‘short frame’ 
is only used for a few commands. The standard specifies tha t ‘standard frames’ are used for 
the rest of communication. Such frames consist of 9n bits (8 data +  parity bit for each of n 
bytes) along with the SOF and EOF markers (each being 1 bit long) with each bit encoded as 16 
samples. Based on this, the shortest possible standard frame (n =  1) will consist of (9 x 16) +  32 
samples. Civen the ability to accurately detect the start of the frame, the correct end of frame 
is found by adjusting the rough frame end position until the resulting frame length minus the 
length of SOF /  EOF markers is a multiple of 9 x 16 =  144. Manchester encoded bits are decoded 
using a cross correlator and the frame error rate is finally computed.
6.4 E xperim enta l Set-U p
The aim of this work was to determine the reliability with which an eavesdropper could recover 
information from a contactless transaction based on the ISO 14443 standard. To do so some 
known frames had to be transm itted according to the specifications detailed in the previous 
section and eavesdropped at the receiving end. In order for the obtained results to be reliable, 
the number of frames transm itted had to be large enough to allow sufficient errors to occur. 
Civen the additional task of simulating different power levels for an eavesdropping distance of 
20-170 cm, a lot of experiments had to be carried out, so it was decided to transm it 5000 frames. 
This was large enough to cause errors and at 20 minutes per run allowed the completion of a set 
of experiments in a single day.
In order for the obtained results to be entirely based on the capabilities and performance of 
the receiver design under test, the decision to experiment in a controlled environment was 
made. By running the experiments inside an anechoic chamber it was ensured that no external 
interference would be affecting the results. Most of the equipment was kept outside the chamber
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Figure 6.10: Experimental set-up
and an RE cable was used to feed the signal to the transm itter antenna inside the chamber. 
By doing so, the risk of cross-coupling between measurement equipment was avoided. Tests 
were conducted to verify such coupling was not present. Measurements were taken inside the 
chamber with no active transmission and the eavesdropped data was then processed, looking for 
any modulation that would have meant the cross-coupling of interfering signals or harmonics 
from the equipment outside. Fig. 6.10 illustrates the whole arrangement. Inside the chamber, 
the transm itting antenna was kept at a fixed position. The receiving antenna connected to 
the receiver circuit (shown in Fig. 6.11(a)) was moved at various distances, in increments of 
5 cm. Power levels resulting in H-field strength of 1.45, 3.45 and 7.45 A m"^ were used. These 
values allowed the emulation of the minimum, maximum and an in-between value of what is 
specified in the standard. For reception, two different antenna designs were used. The single 
loop cylindrical antenna, identical to the transm itting antenna, shown in Fig. 6.11(b) and a 
shopping trolley [63]. The trolley was positioned 2-30 cm away from the transm itting antenna. 
Once all captures were completed they were processed offline. A first set of experiments was 
performed with 500 transm itted frames. This frame size was chosen in order to determine a 
suitable pair of a and p values within reasonable time. Eavesdropped data at each distance 
and H-field strength was processed with a range of Gaussian smoothing factors, with cr in the 
range of 0-40, and p in the range of 49-65%. Error rates obtained were then plotted as shown 
in Fig. 6.12. This was done to determine whether a single pair of cr, p values could be used at
(a) Com munication receiver (b) T ransm itting antenna
Figure 6.11: Receiving and transm itting ends of the experimental set-up
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all distances and H-field strengths. Empty spaces on the pseudo-colour plots indicate instances 
were no frames were detected at all or frames were received at a length that was not a multiple 
of the the ‘standard frame’ size as described earlier. The pair of cr =  10, p =  57 was found to 
give consistently good results. The worst case scenario was assumed, for example the furthest 
distance at a particular H-field strength that eavesdropping was possible and looked for a pair 
there that worked at all distances regardless of the H-field strength. This pair was not always 
the ideal choice, for example at 85 cm cr =  10, p =  61 gave a lower FER. However, this set 
of values (10, 57) performed consistently well across all distances. Establishing a pair of values 
tha t performs consistently well is important because the attacker will not have knowledge of the
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eavesdropped H-field strength or distance, let alone the current SNR.
6.5 R esu lts
All results presented in this section are for transmissions of 5000 frames. Experiments con­
firmed that eavesdropping distance depends on the transm it power and the resulting H-field 
strength. Distances achieved were between 20-90 cm in the case of the maximum H-field strength 
(7.45 A m “ ^). From additional contracted work that was carried out with commercial PCD de­
vices, mobile phones and ISO 14443 Type A smartcards by various manufacturers, it was found 
tha t the generated H-field varies drastically from product to product. It is not unrealistic for 
a victim’s device that is less than 1 cm away from a PCD to generate a high H-field up to the 
maximum 7.5 A m “  ^ to ensure a reliable transaction.
The FERs that were achieved with various H-field strengths and eavesdropping distances are 
illustrated in Fig. 6.13. To ensure the consistency and reliability of these results, experiments 
were repeated on a second day. In the case of 3.45 Am~^, an experiment on a third day was 
also performed. Using normal approximation, interval levels with 95% confidence were also 
plotted for each result. Even with the minimum H-field, reliable eavesdropping was possible up 
to 40 cm. This is still a distance an attacker could easily find himself from his victim without 
raising any suspicion. For example, this could be the case in a crowded underground station or 
at the checkout queue of a supermarket. Another interesting finding is the rate at which the 
FER degrades after a certain point. It can be seen that FER increases very sharply in the space 
of 5 10 cm regardless of the H-field strength. Based on the results shown in Fig. 6.13, achieved 
FERs vary to a small extent. FER for 1.45 Am^^ remained consistent and reproducible through 
all of the experiments. 7.45 A m"^ on the other hand was less consistent as can be seen from 
the first run at that field strength. This was attributed to the fact that as the eavesdropping 
distance gets longer, correct alignment of the two antennas becomes more difficult to accomplish 
and at the same time it has a much greater impact on the results. The reason for this behaviour 
is the very low SNR at these distances so even the slightest deviation has a big impact. For 
3.45 A m“ ,^ with the exception of the first experiment the rest returned nearly identical results. 
A shopping trolley was also used as a rogue antenna to see whether a large metallic structure, 
such as a trolley or metallic shelving found in an environment where eavesdropping is likely to 
happen, could be effective at eavesdropping. The arrangement is illustrated in Fig. 6.14. The
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Figure 6.14: Shopping trolley eavesdropping arrangement
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key difference compared to the inductive loop is that the trolley is a lossy antenna, and generates 
its own noise [59]. This changes the noise floor of the antenna and consequently the cr, p pair 
used before is no longer applicable to this antenna. By repeating the same process as described 
in the previous section it was found that the trolley gave the lowest FER with cr =  10, p =  50, 
and these results are illustrated in Fig. 6.15. The difference in FER between H-field strengths 
is similar to what was achieved with the inductive loop, in terms of the relative eavesdropping 
distances, though they are all shorter. A key difference was the FER at the minimum field 
strength, were in steps of 2 cm no errors occurred from 4-6 cm and then at 8 cm the FER shot 
to 100%. This is because the transm itted H-field strength was already very low at 1.5 A m“  ^
and given that H-field strength is inversely proportional to the cube of the distance, a very small 
change in eavesdropping distance will have drastic effects, as observed here. Because of the lack 
of intermediate points a logarithmic scale was not used for the plotting of these results.
6.6 C onclusions
Eavesdropping on NFC communication has been shown to be largely dependant on the strength 
of the magnetic field generated by the target device. Depending on the H-field strength eaves­
dropping distance can be within the 20-90 cm range in a shielded environment with reliable, 
inconspicuous equipment. Such an environment is not unrealistic as similar conditions could be
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found in an underground station which is shielded from HF radio stations. This is the main 
source of noise and interference at the HF band. In environments such as underground stations 
or supermarkets an attacker is likely to find luggage /  shopping trolleys or other large metallic 
structures that this thesis has shown how to easily modify to act as eavesdropping antennas. Ad­
ditionally, small loop antenna designs have also been suggested tha t achieve even better results 
while remaining pocket-sized.
All of the work presented in this chapter was carried out using low cost, off-the-shelf electronics 
along with a DAQ card. This card in a system designed to be deployed, can be replaced with 
a considerably less expensive FPGA-based system or a laptop-based DAQ. An attacker could 
assemble our receiver at low cost and easily conceal it in a backpack thus making it a portable 
eavesdropping system.
This is in contrast to what previously published research has shown, where bulky and expensive 
equipment was used in order to maximise the efficiency of the proposed eavesdropping system. 
The approach and implementation that has been presented in this chapter not only achieves 
reliable eavesdropping from distances that an attacker is likely to find himself from his target in 
public places, but does so by using equipment that will not cause suspicion. The same cannot 
be said for the equipment that was being suggested in recently published research.
Additionally, by making use of Gaussian smoothing and variance computation, an attacker 
can achieve frame synchronisation in a robust way. It was shown that a well chosen pair of 
fixed parameters works consistently well regardless of the eavesdropping distance or the H-field 
strength and only depends on the characteristics of the eavesdropping antenna. This reliability 
will improve the likelihood of an eavesdropping attack being successful.
It would be useful to obtain a model for the eavesdropping arrangement presented here; this 
would facilitate the estimation of performance of different antennas. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
an improvement of up to 3 dB could be achieved by using the optimum antenna design. A model 
of the eavesdropping receiver would allow us to determine the impact of such an improvement.
While we have demonstrated an ability to successfully eavesdrop a contactless transaction, this 
does not guarantee that the attacker will be able to cause financial loss or compromise the 
privacy and anonymity of his target. The next chapter will present two proof-of-concept attacks 
tha t could benefit from a modified eavesdropping system such as the one that was designed and 
analysed in this chapter.
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A journal publication, ‘Eavesdropping Near Field Communications: A Quantitative Analysis’, 
was published by the lET Journal of Engineering in October 2013 containing the work that was 
presented in this chapter.
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Chapter 7
Security & Privacy Concerns
In the previous chapters, work on the design and evaluation of a functional eavesdropping system 
was presented. Unlike recently published research, this system relied on a low cost, easily con- 
cealable communications receiver and inconspicuous rogue antenna designs. Metallic structures 
such as a luggage /  shopping trolley that one is likely to find in the vicinity of an environment 
such as a supermarket or train station, where an eavesdropping attack aiming to compromise 
either security or privacy of the target is likely to take place were used. Other rogue antenna 
designs tha t were evaluated include a piece of wire at a quarter of the wavelength (%5 m) and a 
H-loop pocket sized antenna.
A quantitative analysis in the form of FER was also presented based on the results that were 
obtained when the designed eavesdropping system was tested in a controlled environment with a 
variety of magnetic field strengths that better emulate the behaviour of commercial contactless 
cards. Given the broad range of magnetic field strengths (1.5-7.5 A m “ )^ the ISO 14443 standard 
specifies, measurements over the whole of this range are necessary in order to fully evaluate 
possible eavesdropping distances. Close to zero EER was achieved from up to 45 cm even when 
the target was emitting the minimum magnetic field strength thus one of the goals of this thesis, 
of implementing an eavesdropping system the average attacker could build and use reliably under 
a variety of SNRs, was achieved.
The fact tha t such an easily deployable eavesdropping system was found to reliably eavesdrop 
from up 45 cm away, makes it a solid foundation for evolving it into a remote interrogation 
system by incorporating skimming and eavesdropping capabilities on the same package. Such a 
system would, in theory, be capable of powering up, request information and reliably listen to
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the response from at least 45 cm away tha t the eavesdropping system was shown to be capable 
of.
Based on this concept of remote interrogation and reliable eavesdropping, this chapter will 
present how such a system could be used to carry out novel attacks against EMCON-based 
contactless payment systems. A previously published attack, referred to as ‘pre-play attack’, 
against contact-based EMV smartcards that allowed the attacker under certain circumstances 
to withdraw cash from the victim’s account at an ATM, was used as the basis for the work 
presented in this chapter. Proof-of-concept experiments verifying the possibility of this attack 
being successful against contactless cards are discussed along with an evaluation of the extent 
to which the financial security and privacy of an individual could be compromised with the aid 
of the proposed technology.
7.1 In troduction  to  th e  P re-P lay  A ttack
This section will provide an introduction to the previously published pre-play attack and its 
fundamental principles along with an overview of a typical ATM transaction, illustrated in 
Fig. 7.1.
7.1.1 EM V ATM transaction flow
EMV based cards come equipped with a chip that securely holds EMV formatted information in 
a file system consisting of applications (VISA, Mastercard, AMEX etc.), files and records. Each 
specific application has a unique ID (AID) and a number of files associated with it, listed in the 
Application File Locator (AFL) which in turn contains a range of records that can be read by 
a reader, one at a time.
Once an application has been selected, the reader then attem pts to read the data records as­
sociated with the AID it has chosen. The process of selecting an application and reading its 
associated information is illustrated in Fig. 7.2(a). Attempting to read records outside of the 
range specified in the AFL should in theory result in error as this is a mechanism the chip uses 
to protect sensitive information such as private keys and PIN value [16]. At this stage the card 
also gives the reader its Application Interchange Profile (AIP) which lists all the of the card’s 
processing capabilities. The AIP also contains instructions whether the particular card supports
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Figure 7.1: EMV based ATM transaction flow
offline data authentication, Cardholder Verification, Terminal Risk Management and finally at 
the end of the transaction, issuer authentication. A ‘processing restrictions’ check is performed 
by the terminal to determine whether the requested transaction should be processed based on 
certain conditions. Such conditions include (but are not limited to) expiration date and transac­
tion type (domestic or foreign, cash, purchase or cash back). By reading the Application Usage 
Code Control (AUCC) field the reader can know if the card’s issuer has set it to decline any 
particular transaction. Any decision made at this stage will be later checked against pre-defined 
card and device settings to establish the final outcome. An ATM is not supposed to decline 
an attem pted transaction based on the expiration date unless the card’s AUCC ‘decline offline’ 
part is flagged as true [64].
In the case of an ATM transaction as used in the attack of [42], the reader does not perform 
offline data authentication and it relies instead on the card’s issuer for verifying the contents 
of the card. This approach is used to keep the maintenance cost of ATMs low and to also 
provision for older machines with low processing power. Cardholder Verification in the case of 
an ATM transaction will always be through Online PIN verification, at least in the case of VISA
Skimming Device PICC Protocol Phase
SELECT j^P S E  ____________ ^
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Figure 7.2: Selecting a card resident application and reading associated data records
issued cards [64]. Terminal Risk Management is also not performed by online-only devices such 
as ATMs because all transactions are to be handled online [64]. At this stage the Terminal 
Verification Results (TVR) held is created. For details on its structure refer to [16]. Terminal 
Action Analysis will consequently always result in a request by the ATM to the card to perform 
a transaction online. An ATM will only decline to participate in the transaction if it cannot go 
online due to a failure. This condition is stated in the Terminal Action Code (TAG) [64].
The hnal steps include online processing, transaction completion and conclusion. For all trans­
actions the terminal will request an application cryptogram (AC) from the card. Table 7.1 lists 
all possible cryptograms for EMV transactions. The cryptogram, referred to as Authorisation 
Request Cryptogram (ARQC) for online transactions, is a combination of static and dynamic 
data from both the card and the issuer along with a nonce termed ‘Unpredictable Number’ 
(UN). The terminal sends the necessary data to the card with a GENERATE AC command. 
The card will perform a Message Authentication Code (MAC) on the serial concatenation of the 
data it received from the terminal and its own data, which will then pass to the terminal. The
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Table 7.1; Summary of all possible responses to a Generate AC request
Response
TC
ARQC
AAC
Description
Approval of offline transaction 
Requesting online authorisation for transaction 
Transaction declined by card
terminal will then pass it to the issuer along with all the data it originally sent to the card. The 
issuer attem pts to reconstruct the same ARQC as the one it received from the issuer and also 
checks for any proprietary information it may require from the card. It is able to reconstruct 
the received ARQC because it has knowledge of the private key the card used to compute the 
MAC.
If successful at this, the issuer issues an Application Response Cryptogram (ARPC) for the 
card and an Authorisation Response Code (ARC) for the terminal instructing it to accept the 
transaction. The ARC instructs the terminal how to request a completion of the transaction 
from the card. If the ARC indicates that the issuer has accepted the transaction then the 
terminal will request an approval cryptogram (TC) from the card, otherwise it will request 
the decline cryptogram (AAC). The terminal sends the ARPC it received to the card through 
another GENERATE AC command which is termed ‘second Generate AC’. Through this second 
Generate AC the terminal is asking for the card’s approval. The card at this point is able to 
decline the transaction, if for instance it is not able to construct an ARPC that is identical to 
the one it received, meaning that the terminal spoke to an issuer the card cannot trust. If the 
card is satisfied with the outcome of its ARPC then it will issue the TC and send it to the 
terminal. This TC is sent to the issuer at a later time, not in real time. Issuer authentication is 
optional for cards and thus an ARPC will not always be returned by the issuer. This process is 
illustrated in Fig. 7.3.
7.1.2 Contact-based pre-play attack
The idea behind the pre-play attack [42] is to exploit a vulnerability at the ‘Online Processing’ 
step discussed in the previous section and illustrated in Fig. 7.1. At this stage, the card proves 
its genuineness to the issuer through the ARQC it provides. Part of the ARQC, the UN, is what 
ensures the issuer of the freshness of the ARQC. Bond et.al in [42] showed that it is possible for 
an attacker to have knowledge of the value of the UN some ATMs will be generating at a given
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Figure 7.3: Completing an online transaction
point in time. This is possible because either an ATM is using just a counter to generate it 
(EMV only requires four consecutive UNs to have different values) or defective random number 
generators such as the one discussed in [42].
The authors of [42] managed to extract a number of ARQCs from a card when its owner partic­
ipated in a transaction at a compromised PoS. Those ARQCs (along with other data shown in 
Table 7.2) were then copied to a programmable smartcard with its own on-board clock, capable 
of observing the counter of the ATM it is being used at and then decide when to initiate the 
transaction. Once the ATM presents a ‘weak’ UN, the smartcard will look it up in its internal 
lookup table and find the corresponding ARQC that was extracted earlier at the compromised 
PoS [42]. It should be noted that the country where the attack is executed, the amount of cash 
the attacker wishes to withdraw and the date he wishes to do so need to match the values that 
were specified during the acquisition of the ARQCs. This scenario’s success is based on the 
assumption tha t the attacker has prior knowledge of the victim’s PIN. The authors of the paper 
suggested that this can be achieved during the legitimate transaction at the compromised PoS, 
while the victim is entering the PIN the cashier tries to acquire it through visual inspection also 
known as ‘shoulder surfing’. The pre-play attack as described above, is illustrated in Fig. 7.4(a).
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Table 7.2: Minimum data elements for online requested transactions
Data Element Name Source /  Value
Amount Reader
Amount, Other Reader (fixed)
Terminal Country Code Reader
Terminal Verification Results Reader
Transaction Currency Code Reader
Transaction Date Reader
Transaction Type Reader (fixed)
Unpredictable Number (UN) Reader
Application Interchange Profile card
Application Transaction Counter card
Application Cryptogram card
Cryptogram Information Data card
Issuer Application Data card
Track 2 Equivalent Data card
7.1.3 C ontactless pre-play attack
The following section will investigate whether it would be possible to extract a number of ARQCs 
from a contactless EMV card (or NFC device) thus eliminating the need for a tampered PoS 
and the victim’s interaction. This would modify the pre-play attack to a ‘contactless’ pre-play 
attack, as illustrated in Fig. 7.4(b).
Based on Fig. 7.4, for the contactless pre-play attack to be successful a skimming device needs 
to power up, query and eavesdrop on the response (ARQC) of the target card without the 
involvement of the victim in a transaction unlike the case of the contact-based pre-play attack. 
The process of powering up and preparing the contactless card for further communication is 
illustrated in Fig. 7.5. Records are read in a fashion similar to that used for a contact based 
card, as illustrated in Fig. 7.2. Potential success of this scenario was based on the results obtained 
in [65] where the ability to reliably eavesdrop the transmission coming from a contactless device 
set-up to emulate the behaviour of an ISO 14443 compliant contactless card was established, 
from up to 40 cm away in the case of the minimum field strength being transm itted by the card. 
Once all necessary records are read by the skimming device, it can then issue the ‘Generate AC’ 
command to request the generation of an ARQC by the contactless card. The reader device 
(skimmer) is responsible for including in the Generate AC command the data elements listed 
in Table 7.2. The values of these data elements need to match those that will be used at the
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Figure 7.4: Contactless and contact based pre-play attacks
vulnerable ATM when the attack is executed. It should be noted tha t the data elements listed in 
T able7.2 are the minimum specified in EMV’s common core specifications^. Depending on the 
particular application, a card may request additional data elements specific to that particular 
scheme. The data elements tha t make up the ARQC are stored in the Card Risk Management 
D ata Object List (CDOLl), tha t the attacker can skim off the contactless card with a READ 
RECORD command. Eor the purpose of this work only the minimum number of data elements 
was considered, illustrated in Eig. 7.6(a), as further information is not publicly available. Once 
assembled, the Generate AC request is then sent to the contactless card to construct the desired
^The common core issued by EMV as a guideline to  scheme operators to  help them  design their own imple­
m entation of EMV products [16, 60]
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Figure 7.5: Sequence of powering up a target a contactless card and putting it in a state ready 
to extract information from
ARQC in a fashion similar to that described in Section 7.1.1.
The construction of the ARQC is illustrated in Fig. 7.6(b). A cryptographic algorithm is used 
to compute the MAC of the data elements sent by the reader along with the Issuer Application 
Data (lAD) and Application Transaction Counter (ATC). The lAD is the card’s internal risk 
management and contains proprietary application data that the issuer expects to receive as 
part of an online transaction. Due to its proprietary nature, no scheme specific information is 
publicly available. It is unknown whether the lAD generated by a contactless transaction is 
different to tha t generated by a contact based transaction. The ATC on the other hand is a 
counter stored on the card to keep track of how many successful transactions the particular card 
has participated in. Card issuers allow for a ‘window’ between the last seen ATC and the one 
currently presented to them. This is done to allow offline transactions in-between as the ATC 
is used for both online and offline transactions. The attacker needs to take care not to deviate 
too much from this window otherwise the issuer of the card may become suspicious of the ATM 
transaction.
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Figure 7.6: Generation of online authorisation cryptogram (ARQC) procedure
Once the cryptogram is computed, it will be sent to the reader along with all the data elements 
that were used for its computation with the addition of the Cryptogram Information Data 
(CID) making up the complete ARQC. The CID indicates the type of cryptogram the card has 
generated and in the case of an ATM transaction this will always be an ARQC.
7.2 E xperim ental M eth od  and R esu lts
The previous section discussed how one could, in theory, read information and harvest ARQCs 
from a contactless card. The ARQCs and read information can then be used to carry out a 
pre-play attack at vulnerable ATMs as discussed in [42]. In reality though, the use of proprietary 
schemes by issuers of contactless cards means it might not be possible to extract an ARQC from 
a real card. Even if an ARQC could be extracted, it may contain information that makes that 
ARQC either unsuitable (due to the lAD that was discussed in the previous section) for use as 
part of the pre-play attack or allow the issuer of the card to detect that is was obtained over the 
contactless interface. Either scenario could result in the failure of the attack.
This section presents the approach taken in determining whether valid ARQCs can be extracted.
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(a) Contact card interrogation (b) Contactless card interrogation
Figure 7.7: Contact and contactless card interrogation
along with the obtained results. Secondly, additional sensitive information tha t was extracted 
such as the cardholder name (CHN), Track 2 Equivalent D ata (T2) and primary account number 
(PAN) is also discussed. Such information could be used in attacks other than the contactless 
pre-play attack with the potential to compromise the victim’s privacy and anonymity. A Bank 
A Scheme A credit card was available for all the experiments tha t were conducted, with some 
additional cards being available only on a single occasion. In order to protect the identity of 
the issuing banks and scheme operator of each card tha t was tested, the name of the bank and 
scheme has been masked as ‘Bank X  Scheme Y \  Getting ‘real’ cards to experiment with proved 
difficult as it requires the consent of the owner and not many were comfortable with giving up 
their contactless cards for experimentation. This was a major challenge tha t was faced while 
performing these experiments.
A commercially available dual interface card reader was used along with Consult Hyperion’s 
in-house software. The set-up is shown in Fig. 7.7. As it can be seen from the figure, the 
test was performed with the contactless card close to the reader since remote interrogation was 
assumed to be possible given previously published work [22] and reliable eavesdropping in [65]. 
Tests were carried out to determine if extracting all the necessary information over the air from 
a contactless card was possible and whether there were any obvious differences between contact 
and contactless ARQCs.
7.2.1 Extracting a contactless ARQC
Initial tests were carried out with a low transaction value of £0.01 to ensure the card would 
not block itself after a number of back-to-back transactions. These transactions were attem pted
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Table 7.3: Summary of lAD tests
Interface Transaction Generate AC Request lAD
Contactless Offline First 06 OA OA 03 90 00 00
Contactless Online First 06 OA OA 03 AO 00 00
Contact Online
First
Second
06 OA OA 03 A 4 AO 02 
06 OA OA 03 25 AO 02
offline at first to determine whether the card under investigation had a transaction counter 
limit. Such a limit depends on the card’s individual internal risk management rules. Fifteen 
consecutive transactions were attem pted and the card completed them all. When the transaction 
amount was increased to £20 though, the card declined. This lead to the conclusion that the 
card at hand had a transaction amount limit instead of a transaction counter limit. W hat this 
means is tha t the attacker could attem pt to harvest any amount of ARQCs he wishes without 
the fear of the card blocking itself, at least with the reference card.
The same transaction was repeated but this time online authorisation was requested, meaning 
the reader asked the card for an ARQC. Surprisingly, the card accepted the request and returned 
an ARQC. The transaction amount was then increased to £100 and the transaction was repeated 
five consecutive times, with the card returning identical ARQCs all five times. The fact that the 
card accepted the £100 online transaction but not the £20 offline transaction is worth noting. 
This occurred because the particular card was not alarmed since it did not identify a risk going 
online and depended on the issuer to validate the transaction, leading to the successful extraction 
of an ARQC over the contactless interface without the owner’s interaction.
As discussed in Section 7.1.3, the lAD is the data record tha t is more likely to alarm the 
issuer about the validity of an ARQC. The ATC even though a variable, does not alter its 
state depending on the interface used but rather on the number of transactions the card has 
completed. The CID as described earlier, indicates the type of cryptogram that the card has 
generated and in the case of online authentication this will always be an ARQC. Therefore in 
order to determine whether the successfully harvested ARQCs could substitute those harvested 
over the contact based interface, the lAD fields obtained from contactless and contact based 
offline as well as online transactions listed in Table 7.3, were compared.
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Table 7.4: CVR bytes from all obtained IADs
Interface Transaction Hex Binary
Response to first 
Generate AC
Response to second 
G enerate AC
Contactless Offline 90 10 01 0000 TC =  Approve n /a
Contactless Online AO 10 10 0000 ARQC n /a
Contact Online
A4 10 10 0100 ARQC n /a
25 00 10 0101 ARQC AAC — Decline
7.2.2 I AD  analysis
The obtained IADs and the common core version of the I AD were not of the same format. 
The obtained lAD had two length indicators (first and fourth bytes, read from left to right) 
of subsequent bytes while the common core version of the lAD lists only one. This led to 
the conclusion tha t the particular scheme operator is using a proprietary format for the I AD. 
By comparing the received IADs for both contact and contactless interfaces it was found that 
the first four bytes of the IADs were identical. This behaviour led to the belief that the fifth 
byte (shown in bold) of this proprietary scheme is the equivalent of the Cardholder Verification 
Results (CVR) mentioned in the common core guidelines [16] since the CVR is the part that 
holds information on what type of cryptogram the card generated (online, decline, approval).
It was then decided to test this theory by comparing the obtained CVRs, shown in Table 7.4, 
against the common core version of the CVR from [16]. In the case of the offline contactless 
transaction, the CVR reveals tha t a 2nd GEN AC was not requested, the card responded to the 
issued Generate AC with an AC of type TC (approval) and tha t no digital signatures were used 
for offline authentication of the card by the reader. This behaviour was expected because the 
transaction value was low (£0.01) and no online authentication was requested, hence the TC 
response. In the case of the online contactless transaction, the CVR points to no 2nd Generate 
AC issued, the card responded with an ARQC and again no digital signatures were checked. 
Comparing the contactless CVR byte with tha t from an online contact based transaction revealed 
some difference between the two.
To begin with, the contact based transaction returned two ARQCs hence two IADs and two 
CVR bytes. The reason for this is due to the different way the two interfaces handle transaction 
completion as discussed in Section 7.1.1. A contactless card, unlike a contact based card, does
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not verify the issuer’s response and then authorise the transaction through a 2nd Generate AC. 
This explains the presence of two cryptograms in the case of the contact based transaction. For 
the purpose of the pre-play attack the 2nd Generate AC is of no interest because as discussed in 
[42], the clone card can be programmed by the attacker to respond to the 2nd Generate AC with 
acceptance of the transaction. The terminal has no means of verifying the card’s response so 
once it receives a TG from the card the transaction is concluded. Based on this, if the contactless 
lAD matches that of the contact based transaction then the contactless ARQC will in theory 
be appropriate for the pre-play attack.
Comparing the CVRs of the two (contactless and first contact) IADs it can be seen that they 
are identical with the exception of one bit. This bit indicates that Offline Dynamic Data Au­
thentication (DDA) was performed. This happened because the reader used was programmed 
by default to emulate a PoS and not an ATM. As discussed in Section 7.1.1, ATMs are not 
supposed to perform any form of offline data authentication. Due to the limited time the reader 
was available for these experiments, it was not possible to customise the reader to act like an 
ATM.
Returning to Table 7.3, the last pieces of the lAD puzzle are the second and third bytes to the 
right of ‘03’ byte. It can be seen right away that these two bytes were different between the 
contact and contactless IADs. It was not possible to determine what these two bytes represent 
due to the proprietary nature of lAD this particular card was using. They could very well be 
the ‘Issuer Discretionary D ata’ specified in the common core version of the lAD in [16].
W ith no further information available it is impossible to confidently say whether these two bytes 
contain information tha t could potentially let the issuer know that such an ARQC was obtained 
through the contactless interface. Harvesting ARQCs from a contactless card was possible and 
their analysis established that such ARQGs can be extracted in a form that is identical to those 
extracted over the contact based interface.
7.2.3 Reading additional data over the air
An ARQG was not the only piece of information that was extracted over the air. Being aware of 
potentially sensitive information currently being transm itted in the clear [38], led to the decision 
to test how much could be extracted from a card without participating in a transaction. It was
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Table 7.5: Comparison of data elements obtained over the contact and contactless interface of 
a number of cards
Data Element
T2 PAN PSN GHN
Bank A Scheme A Credit card Identical Identical Identical Identical
Bank A Scheme A Debit card Identical Identical Identical Not tested
Bank A Scheme B Credit card Identical Identical Identical Not tested
Bank B Scheme B Credit card Identical Identical Identical Not tested
Bank C Scheme G Credit card Different Identical Identical Not tested
possible to extract sensitive information such as T2, PAN , PAN Sequence Number^ (PSN) and 
the cardholer’s name. As these experiments were conducted on a different day, more cards were 
available for experimentation. The obtained results are presented in Table 7.5. The fact that 
both PAN and PSN fields came out identical for both interfaces, is extremely important because 
either of these two fields can be used by the issuer to derive the encryption key it has to use in 
order to produce an ARQC identical to that received from the card. If a card uses a different 
PAN for the contactless interface then the resulting ARQC will not match tha t produced over 
the contact-based interface and therefore the ARQC harvested over the air as described earlier 
will not be suitable for use as part of a pre-play attack at a vulnerable ATM. This is another 
decision that is left up to the issuer of a particular card.
The T2 though was not identical for both interfaces. Bank C’s credit card returned different T2 
records. T2 consists of the PAN, expiration date (YYMM) and discretionary data that depends 
on the specific scheme. Given the fact that PSN and PAN were the same for both interfaces 
(when read through their individual record) of this card led to the conclusion that the difference 
in T2 was due to the discretionary data byte. Since only generic information is available, it was 
impossible to investigate this discretionary data any further.
The cardholder’s name experiments were performed on a different day where only one card was 
available for testing, hence the incomplete results in Table 7.5. It was possible to read the GHN 
held^ even though this data field is meant to be revealed by the card only during contact-based
^Identifies and differentiates cards w ith the same PAN
^Cardholder nam e is an optional piece of information for contactless cards
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transactions. As a m atter of fact, this record was not even listed in the card’s AFL. It was 
extracted through some trial and error. For example, if the AFL instructs the reader tha t it is 
allowed to read file ‘OF with records ‘I-IO’, the reader asked for file ‘02’ and ‘03’. There was no 
indication that such files existed but through this approach it was possible to read a data record 
a contactless reader was not supposed to in the first place. W hether all cards issued by Bank A 
use the same location to store this held is unknown. This particular card was issued on 10/11 
so it is a relatively old card.
7.3 Im plem entation  and E valuation
Proof-of-concept implementations for the remote harvesting of ARQCs and other sensitive in­
formation from dual-interface EMV cards were tested. As discussed in the previous section, it 
was possible to extract ARQCs that could, in theory, be indistinguishable from their contact 
based counterparts. Having said this, all of the discussed results were obtained over a very short 
distance (less than 2 cm).
This section will suggest how an attacker could assemble together equipment that would allow 
him to remotely harvest ARQCs and other sensitive information in similar fashion to what was 
shown earlier in this chapter. This arrangement is illustrated in Fig. 7.4(b) and eliminates the 
need for a tampered PoS terminal or the victim participating in a sale and entering his PIN. 
The potential limitations either due to the nature of the equipment or the existing security 
features in EMV specifications are also discussed. Finally, possible countermeasures against this 
implementation are also suggested.
7.3.1 Im plem entation
For the contactless pre-play attack to be successfully implemented, the attacker needs to ensure 
the following: a) Power-up the target card with enough energy to backscatter a response;
b) reliably listen  to  the response; c) Request and obtain a valid ARQ C response that 
is identical to the one a contact-based transaction would generate; and d) the victim’s PIN . 
Energising a contactless card with enough power to generate a response H-field that the attacker 
can recover data from, requires an amount of power that will depend on the desired interrogation 
distance. Kirschenbaum and Wool in [22] presented a low cost RFID Skimmer capable of reading
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ISO 14443 tags from a distance of ~  25 cm with the possibility of reaching % 35 cm given further 
improvements. Once the target contactless card is energised, the RFID skimmer will have to 
carry out the procedure shown in Fig. 7.5 in order to put the card in the ‘ACTIVE’ state as 
required by [48] before being able to request any information from it and listen to the response. 
The attacker will have to implement the anti-collision algorithm described in [48] as he is likely 
to be within the vicinity of a number of contactless cards and therefore need to ensure that only 
one card at a time is put in the ‘ACTIVE’ state.
Once activated, the procedure that will lead to the request and response with an ARQC is 
illustrated in Fig. 7.2. The illustrated process remains fairly consistent across different cards and 
shows the process the attacker needs to follow , but there can be variations to the process based 
on the target card. For example, the card /  NFC device might have more than one application 
installed^. The attacker needs to actively select the one he wishes to interrogate and adjust the 
interrogation process accordingly. As an example, the VISA scheme uses the ‘C FO ’ command to 
request a cryptogram generation from the card instead of a separate Cenerate AC [66]. The end 
result will be the same (the generation and return of an ARQC) but based on this differentiation, 
the attacker will have to program the skimming device to be compatible with a variety of targets.
The attacker will also have to trick the card issuer into believing that cardholder verification was 
performed successfully. In the case of an ATM transaction, the cardholder would normally enter 
his PIN but tha t does not happen during the contactless pre-play attack proposed by this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the attacker needs to be able to trick the target ATM and issuer into believing 
that PIN entry did indeed occur, otherwise the issuer will decline the harvested ARQCs. This 
is due to the requirement by EMV specifications that ARQCs are generated after PIN entry has 
been performed. In order to overcome this, the attacker will have to ensure that the ‘Online 
PIN entered’ bit in the TVR is set to ‘1’ [60] even though in reality no PIN entry was ever 
performed. Finally, there is the issue of offline authentication. ATMs manufacturers are allowed 
not to implement offline authentication and this is usually the most popular approach [16]. The 
attacker needs to set the ‘Offline data authentication was performed’ bit in the TVR to 0 while 
harvesting an ARQC.
Using the equipment shown Fig. 7.8 it was possible to eavesdrop contactless communication with 
close to zero Frame Error Rates (EER) from distances up to 45 cm away from a source emitting
A pplication  refers to  different card schemes (VISA, M astercard, AMEX etc.) or loyalty cards
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Figure 7.8: Covert receiver and antenna size comparison against a commercial PCD
a H-field of 1.5 A m “  ^ in a shielded environment (anechoic chamber) [65]. Such equipment 
is relatively inexpensive and easily concealable. If the attacker intends on carrying out the 
contactless pre-play attack as suggested here, he would have to carry around with him a compact 
battery to power up the receiver along with the RFID skimmer [22]. Also, with the eavesdropping 
system used for this thesis, a desktop computer for offline data processing was used together 
with a DAQ card for the capturing of data samples. A bulky signal generator as the external 
trigger source for our DAQ was also used. This set-up however, can be replaced with a portable 
device (e.g. laptop or tablet) and a FPCA  to act as portable DAQ and trigger source. In terms 
of software, this system has only been tested in scenarios where the card responded with a 100% 
loaded carrier (OOK) while some cards may load the carrier in the range of 10-90% depending 
on the resistive load each card uses. The last missing link for a successful pre-play attack 
(regardless of interface), is the PIN associated with the victim’s card. In the case of the contact 
based attack, the attacker could observe the victim as he entered his PIN at the PoS and make 
a note of it. For the contactless attack, an alternative method is available. This can be done 
as shown by Emms in [67] using the VERIFY PIN approach, allowing the attacker to remotely 
query the card two times (a third time would often cause the chip to block itself) whether the 
supplied PIN is correct or not. Concealing the equipment described above near a busy train
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station entrance and using a dictionary of 4 digit numbers (common or not) at a place as busy 
as London Waterloo station that handles 20% of all central London’s passengers during peak 
hours [68], this means a very large number of guesses thus increasing the chance of capturing a 
valid ARQC and PIN.
DataCenetics team published a report based on findings with four digit passwords condensed 
from released /  exposed /  discovered tables and security breaches [69]. Based on a sample of 
nearly 3.4 million passwords DataCenetics established that the most popular four digit com­
bination was ‘1234’ with a cumulative frequency of nearly 11% followed by ‘1111’ at 6% and 
‘0000’ at 1.8%. A table is published in the report with the 20 most popular combinations with 
a combined cumulative frequency of 26.83%. The number of available PIN attem pts of a card is 
reset every time it successfully completes a transaction [67]. Assuming that the same card will 
pass from the point where the attacker has set up his skimming device (e.g. Waterloo station) 
twice a day, to and from work, and that the card has been used at least once since the first 
interrogation, perhaps for lunch, the attacker would need just five days to cover nearly 30% of 
the most popular 4 digit combinations from the dictionary DataCenetics team used.
7.3.2 Lim itations
The limitations of the con L act less pre-play attack, in addition to those that apply to the pre-play 
attack in [42], are:
• Path loss
• Background Noise
• Proprietary nature of some data elements in EMVCON specifications (i.e. lAD)
Power conveyed from the RFID skimmer to the target degrades rapidly as the path loss at 
13.56 MHz is proportional to where r is the distance from the source [59]. The amount of 
induced current required will also depend on the matching of the specific eavesdropping antenna
[63]. Ensuring that a strong enough energising field reaches the target card is of paramount 
importance in order to reliably recover and decode the interrogation response.
Work in [63] was the first to analyse the propagation range of H-fields from NFC H-antennas using 
realistic designs of rogue eavesdropping antennas. It showed tha t the presence of background
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noise is a good countermeasure to prevent attacks such as the contactless pre-play (or any other 
interrogation /  eavesdropping attack) over distances long enough to be considered a threat. The 
risk is potentially much higher in secluded and crowded locations, such as underground train 
stations, where the environment is shielded from electrical appliances or HF broadcast signals. 
In other environments though, the potential success of the contactless pre-play attack will largely 
depend on the available SNR.
The EMV specifications also impose some limitations, not just the physical limitations of contact­
less payments mentioned above. Processing restrictions is a measure to ensure that a legitimate 
terminal is compatible with the card presented to it and based on their compatibility (or lack 
of), make any necessary adjustments or even reject the transaction [60]. The Application Usage 
Control (AUG) is a data element resident on the card that the terminal checks as part of the 
Processing Restrictions process.
The AUG will show whether the particular card is valid for ATM transactions or not. A card 
may be set to decline ATM transactions if it is a credit card, instead of a debit card. It may also 
be set to reject ATM transactions over the contactless interface. In the case of a rogue reader 
like the one this thesis proposes as part of the skimming device, it can simply be programmed to 
ignore the card’s AUG. This can be achieved by setting the ‘Requested service not allowed for 
card product’ bit in the TVR to ‘O’. This would tell the issuer that the Processing Restrictions 
check was completed successfully. W hether the issuer has knowledge of the AUG, either from 
his database or whether the card shares the AUG as part of the proprietary bits of the I AD (as 
discussed in the previous section) remains unknown. Such a conclusion requires experimental 
testing, due to the proprietary nature of each scheme.
The lAD though, depending on the scheme, may contain further information that could poten­
tially prevent the contactless pre-play attack. Due to the lAD’s proprietary nature, no scheme 
specific information is publicly available. Based on what is available through common core 
specifications and experimental work in Section 7.2, the bytes tha t are likely to vary are bytes 
‘4-8 (GVR)’ and ‘18-32 (Issuer Discretionary D ata)’. The GVR may contain information that 
changes with the current state of the card, e.g. ‘PIN Try’ counter or number of offline trans­
actions performed [16]. To further highlight the proprietary nature of each scheme, the card 
available for experimentation, did not reveal the presence of such counters but it had a transac­
tion value threshold for declining offline transactions instead. It is up to each scheme operator
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to include information that may ‘betray’ the contactless pre-play attack. Based on what is 
currently published in the common core specifications, there is no such information to reveal 
to the issuer that the contactless interface was used to obtain the ARQC. This is the biggest 
differentiation between the attack proposed by this thesis and the classic pre-play attack.
Another, discovered limitation was with a particular scheme issued card. This card returned a 
T2 over the air compared to the contact based interface. Since the T2 is part of the common core 
specification information that the issuer expects to receive as part of an online transaction, it 
can be an effective way of stopping the contactless attack dead in its tracks. Provided of course 
tha t the card issuer thoroughly checks all received data. This is a limitation that is unique to 
the contactless pre-play attack. Having said this though, only one out of the three different 
scheme based cards tested returned a T2 unique to its contactless interface.
7.3.3 Proposed counterm easures
A very effective form of defence against a contactless pre-play attack would be the use of different 
T2 or PAN values for each interface and the card issuer checking these values before accepting 
an online transaction. This is something that is already being used by certain schemes and 
it should become standard practise in order to ensure the security of contactless card holders. 
Since the T2 is already part of the minimum data to be send to the issuer at part of an online 
transaction this change can happen without any revision of the E AI VC ON. It is up to the scheme 
operators and card issuers to personalise their implementations with a T2 specific to each of the 
two interfaces.
Currently both versions of the pre-play attack can evade the ATC check. The ATC is there as 
means for the card’s issuer to keep track of how many transactions the card has participated in. 
Since this counter is shared for online and offline transactions, the card issuer needs to allow a 
certain window from the ATC value it receives from the last online transaction. For example, 
if the last time the issuer saw the card’s ATC and the ATC had a value of 10 then the issuers 
needs to allow perhaps another 20 (purely a suggestive value) offline transactions between the 
last and the next online transaction. This window though allows attackers to collect a number of 
ARQCs equal to the window size, since the ATC is updated at each first Generate AC request.
Based on this example, it should be clear that using a counter for both online and offline 
transactions is pretty ineffective. An alternative would be to use a counter solely for online
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transactions. This way the issuer will be able to spot a discrepancy between the last value of the 
online counter it saw and a higher value as a result of a pre-play attack against this particular 
card. The common core specifications already dictate that each card should have a ‘Last Online 
Application Transaction Counter’ (LOATC) register, which keeps track of the ATC value of 
the last transaction that went online. Since this register is already present in cards today, the 
common core specifications should be updated to require this register as part of the minimum 
data elements for online requested transactions. Due to the fact tha t a standard as big as 
EMVCON would need to be modified, this change could take longer to implement compared to 
the interface-dependent T2 change suggested earlier.
7.4 P rivacy A ttacks
The previous section presented how a remote interrogation system could be assembled by the 
attacker in order to reproduce the results presented in Section 7.2. Primarily the extraction 
of potentially valid ARQCs for use at certain ATMs as part of a pre-play attack. The same 
equipment can be used to extract additional sensitive information, such as the CHN and PAN, 
tha t was experimentally obtained in Section 7.2.3. This section will discuss how tha t sensitive 
information could be used to form a privacy attack against users of contactless cards.
In [70] the authors suggested a way for shops to identify and track the physical location of their 
customers through merchandise containing RFID tags. Such merchandise could be clothes or 
shoes tha t a customer buys from the shop, which in return creates a database where it stores all 
the necessary information at the time of purchase (credit card details, shopping history etc.).
In a similar attem pt to design a system for ‘facilitating a shopping experience’, AMEX filed the 
patent in [71]. The inventors suggested tha t AMEX contactless cards generate a suitable unique 
identifier of the contactless card in conventional ISO 7816 Track 2 Equivalent format. Due to 
consumer concerns /  protest in the USA following the discovery of this patent by CASPIAN^, 
AMEX committed to the reviewing of this proposal and also give the consumers the chance to 
opt in /  out such a scheme. There has been no public information of these promises yet [72].
In Section 7.2.3 it was shown how one could extract from a number of contactless cards informa­
tion such as the CHN and PAN. These two allow an attacker to uniquely identify an individual
’An international consumer group com m itted to  the fighting of the invasion of shoppers’ privacy
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thus compromising his anonymity. W ith the system implementation suggested in the previous 
section, an attacker could achieve the extraction of personal information without the need for 
customers to actually buy anything or have any other form of RFID based item (RFID tag, 
RFID loyalty card) on their person other than a contactless card. Unlike contact-based credit 
or loyalty cards, were the customer willingly hands out personalised information stored in the 
EMV chip, in the case of contactless cards and the suggested remote interrogation attack this 
information (CHN, PAN) could be read without the owner’s consent or even him realising.
Even in the case of AMEX’s patent where the customer has (been promised) the chance to opt 
out from this ‘shopping experience’ feature, he will still be at risk of a privacy attack. W ith the 
proposed remote interrogation system, the attacker can just query the card for the CHN and 
PAN. The PAN was found to be the same for all three different scheme cards tested, regardless 
of the interface (contact or contactless). Examples of scenarios where the remote interrogator 
could be used to carry out privacy attacks are presented in the following subsection.
7.4.1 Com prom ising privacy and anonym ity
All attacks described in the following paragraphs rely on the implementation of a skim /  eavesdrop 
attack as discussed in Section 7.3.1. Based on the experiments and results presented in Table 7.5 
the PAN is a truly unique card element that is independent of the communication interface. 
Even in the case of the Bank C’s card, where a different T2 data element was generated for a 
contactless transaction, the PAN data record was read off the card and was identical between 
interfaces. This provides a reliable and consistent way to track and identify a contactless card 
holder.
One example where a card holder could fall victim to a tracking attack is at his place of work. 
If skimming equipment similar to what was suggested in Section 7.3.1 programmed to query the 
card for its PAN record, is placed near an entry point then it will be possible to record the time 
of entry of an employee at work along with what time they left for a lunch break and what time 
they got back. Their PAN can easily be associated with their name when they first turn up for 
work or by visually inspecting people as they pass through the entry point once. This way for 
example, employers can keep track of their employees working hours. The storage space this 
requires is minimal compared to that of storing CCTV footage (which if available, is also more 
intrusive) and also does not require someone having to sit and watch hours of recorded video.
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Supermarkets are a prime candidate to exploit this kind of information. The PAN could be 
used by supermarkets as an alternative to a loyalty card to keep track of customers’s shopping 
patterns. Not everyone chooses to sign up for a loyalty card at every supermarket they shop 
from. One way this could be implemented is by having some employees of the supermarket 
offering free drinks, chocolate or any other kind of goods to people entering the shop in return 
for their name and /  or email address as part of a survey. At the same time the unsuspecting 
customer’s card is skimmed to reveal the PAN record without him ever realising this has actually 
happened. If the particular customer has not been at the store for some time (based on his PAN 
being in the skimming attack logs) he could be sent mail containing offers at tha t particular 
shop. An easy way for shops to get hold of their customers addresses is through the records they 
keep for online purchases requiring home delivery.
Besides being targeted with promotions and generic offers, customers could have their privacy 
invaded by supermarkets or pharmacies that keep track of their shopping /  browsing history. By 
skimming a customer’s PAN (and CHN if present) at specific parts /  aisles the store can know 
what customers are window shopping. Are they standing in the pregnancy /  baby care section? 
Are they looking at pregnancy tests? The shop can use this information to predict tha t possibly 
a child is on the way for that person and send them wish cards or again relevant promotions. All 
at the expense of the person’s privacy and anonymity. People might also be uncomfortable with 
their supermarket keeping track of how long they were standing in front of the adult literature 
magazine section or at the tobacco /  alcohol section.
A lot of store-issued credit cards are used as loyalty schemes at the same time. By pairing a 
contactless card (or supermarket issued mobile phone with NFC capabilities) and loyalty scheme 
in a single item a shop will be able to keep complete record of not just a customer’s purchases 
but also browsing pattern /  history and based on these it can make predictions about future 
purchases or compile their own ‘wish list’ for tha t person with which they might try and tempt 
him to shop from them by mailing him offers.
7.5 C onclusions
The possibility of extracting a valid ARQC from a contactless card over the air without rely­
ing on the target participating in a transaction with a tampered PoS has been demonstrated. 
Despite the provision in the common core specifications of EMVCON for scheme operators to
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include proprietary data bits in the lAD and vary the input to the cryptographic algorithm, 
no indication pointing towards that direction was found. W ithout access to the confidential 
scheme specifications though, one cannot be 100% certain. Additionally, information such as 
the cardholder’s name and PAN was obtained, information that can uniquely identify a person 
without their permission or involvement in any way.
Given the fact that a contactless card will generate an ARQC and work in the propagation of 
NFC H-fields over distance [63] and quantitative analysis of eavesdropping attacks in [65], one 
could in theory extract multiple ARQCs with close to zero FER from up to 40 cm with equipment 
similar what is shown in Fig. 7.8. This is provided that the presented eavesdropping system is 
modified as discussed in Section 7.3.1 to act as a complete remote interrogation system.
Finally, it was shown how it is possible to uniquely identify a contactless card not only through 
the cardholder name data field (some schemes are already working towards making it unavailable 
over the air) but also through the PAN, since it remains a static and unique data field for each 
card allowing individuals to be tracked or observed by attackers using equipment similar to our 
suggested remote interrogator.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis presents work on the eavesdropping of NFC systems and how such an attack could 
compromise the security and privacy of users of contactless payments. Motivation came from 
an existing concept, tha t of eavesdropping, to which new concepts were introduced such as 
inconspicuous and relatively inexpensive equipment and more importantly eavesdropping of 
NFC systems in a quantitative fashion. This section summarises the key contributions of this 
thesis and plans for further work.
8.1 Sum m ary o f C ontributions
During the literature review it was established tha t eavesdropping was the type of attack that was 
most likely to offer an attacker access to sensitive information that could potentially compromise 
the security and privacy of users of contactless payments. This assumption was based on the fact 
tha t EAIV contactless specifications are largely based on the EMV specifications for conventional 
cards (magstripe, chip based). Sending a transmission down a wire is inherently harder to 
eavesdrop than a transmission over the air and this (along with speed of execution) was possibly 
a major factor that led to the lack of encryption from parts of the communication between the 
card and terminal /  card-issuer.
A quantitative analysis of eavesdropping an NFC system, in terms of FER given an eavesdropping 
distance and a third parameter, magnetic field strength emitted by the target was presented. 
This was achieved using inconspicuous antenna designs such as a modified shopping trolley, 
quarter wavelength wire antenna and a pocket sized H-loop antenna. These antenna designs
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were presented in [59] along with design principles for any large metallic structure that could be 
used as an eavesdropping antenna. Suitable metallic structures include metallic shelves, trolleys 
and shopping baskets. Such structures, when connected via short wires to a tuning circuit with 
a variable capacitor can be tuned in the field to achieve resonance at the desired 13.56 MHz 
frequency and give a suitably high Q factor with low inductance and a high load impedance. 
An example of such a tuning circuit is shown in Appendix A.
Taking work on antenna design a step further, the influence of path loss and antenna orienta­
tion (with regards to the eavesdropped target) was measured for each of the suggested rogue 
antenna designs. The results were published in [63] where it was concluded that a pocket sized 
H-loop antenna was likely to offer the best eavesdropping performance. Experiments were also 
conducted with antennas tha t could be worn over the human body, either as a necklace under 
a top or wired inside a raincoat. The capacitance due to the body’s watery composition, was 
found to be de-tuning the eavesdropping antenna and thus it was decided not to progress with 
the body worn antenna any further.
Having identified two promising inconspicuous antennas (small loop antenna and modified shop­
ping trolley), a quantitative analysis of eavesdropping NEC systems was published in [65]. A 
novel design and implementation of a receiver system based on inexpensive, readily available 
electronic components and a data capture card was used to carry out the measurements. A 
capture card that was used as part of the receiver system was the most expensive piece of equip­
ment, but still significantly cheaper to what others used in the past. The chosen demodulation 
approach not only allowed the design of a low cost communications receiver, but also portable 
and easily concealable in a backpack (for example). Coupled with the proposed inconspicuous 
rogue antenna antenna designs, a cash-deprived attacker could use this complete eavesdropping 
system at a supermarket or underground station without arousing any suspicion.
In addition to hardware demodulation, a simple innovative synchronisation and decoding ap­
proach was also implemented in software. This approach allowed the offline processing of eaves­
dropped data samples with only two processing parameters, that were found to be consistent for 
each antenna design regardless of the eavesdropping distance or magnetic field strength. This 
makes an attack easier as successful eavesdropping does not require any knowledge of the SNR. 
Nearly zero FER were achieved from up to 45 cm away even when the target was transm itting 
the minimum magnetic field strength specified in the governing ISO 14443 standard. Such a
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distance makes it possible for an eavesdropper to carry out his attack when standing next to 
someone in an underground station or at a queue.
Having shown that eavesdropping can be carried out relatively inexpensively, discreetly and 
reliably, the question whether the developed eavesdropping system could be further evolved in 
order to pose a realistic threat to someone’s financial security and privacy was considered. This 
was based on the eavesdropping tests and distances that were published in [65]. Such a system 
would be capable of both remote interrogation and eavesdropping from the same distances that 
were demonstrated during the evaluation of the eavesdropping system. Given such an evolution 
of the eavesdropping system this thesis proposed, certain security and privacy related attacks 
could be made viable.
After coming across the pre-play attack targeting conventional (magstripe and chip based) 
EMV cards and vulnerable ATMs [42], the possibility of using a modified version of this attack 
against contactless cards was examined. The original pre-play attack assumed that a dishonest 
cashier /  shop owner would tamper with his EMV PoS allowing him to extract ARQCs while 
carrying out a legitimate transaction. The contactless pre-play attack proposed by this thesis 
not only introduces a new demographic (contactless cards and NFC devices) but also eliminates 
the need for tampering with a PoS. The attacker simply stands close enough to the target and 
remotely interrogate the contactless card for the desired number of ARQCs.
Proof-of-concept experiments were conducted with commercially available equipment (dual in­
terface card reader) that resulted in the extraction of ARQCs over the contactless interface. 
Subsequent analysis of the obtained ARQCs leaves us confident that what was obtained can 
substitute the ARQCs obtained over a contact based card and be successfully used in ATMs 
with the same vulnerabilities as in [42]. Due to the proprietary nature of each scheme opera­
tor (VISA, Mastercard, AMEX etc.) though, the success of the attack remains uncertain until 
actual testing of the obtained ARQCs in a similar fashion to that in [42] takes place. From 
publicly available common core specifications, there is no reason to believe that the obtained 
ARQCs will be unsuitable.
A potential implementation of the remote interrogator that would be necessary to discreetly 
carry out this attack was also presented. Based on previous work where researchers were able to 
power-up and activate an ISO 14443 RFID tag from up to 25 cm away [22] and the eavesdropping 
system presented in this thesis works reliably up to 45 cm away, such an interrogator could be
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implemented. Design guidelines for doing so were presented in Section 7.3.1.
In addition to harvesting ARQCs from a contactless card, sensitive information such as the 
cardholder’s name and PAN which can be used to uniquely identify and track an individual and 
thus constitute a privacy attack was also experimentally extracted. The suggested remote inter­
rogator system could be used by shop owners or supermarkets to track and record the shopping 
pattern or browsing history of their customers. In the scenarios discussed in Section 7.4.1 using 
this thesis’s proposed implementation, attackers can collect such sensitive information without 
their customers’ consent or them even realising.
8.2 Further W ork
One of the key findings during the analysis and evaluation of the antenna designs presented 
as part of this thesis, was the susceptibility of these rogue antennas to background noise. A 
possible reduction of this susceptibility could be achieved by using larger loop antennas. Such 
an antenna would still have to remain inconspicuous so a suitable form factor would be a loop 
antenna mounted into a rucksack, as illustrated in Fig. 3.8. The rucksack will allow a covert 
interrogator /  eavesdropper to be easily concealed and make it a portable implementation. Using 
such an antenna in environments where there is low interference from HF broadcasting or power 
lines, is likely to offer improved FER. This is expected because of the potentially low noise level 
and also due a larger diameter antenna being less sensitive to its alignment with the target. 
Of further interest would be a comparison of the FER such an implementation could achieve, 
compared to what was presented by this thesis.
Additionally, testing the inconspicuous eavesdropping system using real data from commercial 
NEC devices and contactless cards would be of interest. During the conducted quantitative anal­
ysis of the system synthetic data was used in order to have full control over the transmission and 
reception of an adequately long, randomly generated (but known) sequence. If the transm itted 
sequence was not long enough then the presented results would not have had the required statis­
tical significance. To further enhance the portability of the system and reduce the cost, the data 
capture card could be replaced with an FPGA. As a final improvement, the software receiver 
could be updated to support real time signal processing depending on the intended usage.
Next, the eavesdropping system could be evolved into a remote interrogator, as proposed earlier
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in the thesis. Transmitting adequate power to activate and enable a contactless card to respond 
with sufficient magnetic held strength to be read remotely is the biggest challenge. Additional 
work is required for the implementation of an anti-collision protocol (as specihed in ISO 14443) 
to provision for the scenario where multiple contactless cards will be in the remote interrogator’s 
vicinity similar to the implementation shown by Emms in [67].
Einally, in [63] it was discovered that background noise is a potentially suitable defence against 
eavesdropping attacks. Ideally the measurements that were presented in this thesis would be 
repeated in environments such as underground stations. Such environments are not only ideal 
in the sense of allowing the attacker to be within 45 cm from his target, but also due to the 
station being underground there is the potential of lower interference. From preliminary testing 
it was found tha t at the HF frequency band (used for NFC transactions) most of the interference 
appears to be from amateur short wave radio stations. Underground stations, especially the ones 
in London that tend to be deeper than more modern European metro stations, could be less 
affected. Eurther testing is necessary to measure the levels of background noise in such stations 
and compare them to other environments tha t the experiments presented in this thesis, such as 
computer labs and the anechoic chamber, were performed.
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Appendix A
Technical Details for Receiver Circuit
Schematic
mS-P^RAkETHRS
Stap^M htt
Stef>=10kHz
S  Nub*=1 F*7.96 MHz 
J  Ohm HodBs^nportiohalto freq 
-  Rdc=0.0 dun F=10C.0 MHz 
Mode=r*opoAionM)o#ig 
Rdc=0 0 0*Mm
C=3B0pFpJ
INlKi 1
039 0  pF Moda^fnpcflkml to freq ?
Rdc=4.0 Ohm L L
(a )
Frequency Response
m l
f r e q = 1 2 .5 6 M H z
d B ( S ( 2 .1 ) ) = - 3 .6 9 8
m 2
f r e q = 1 4 .5 6 M H z
d B ( S ( 2 ,1 ) ) = - 2 .6 3 Q
m 1
freq, MHz
(b)
Figure A.l: Communication Receiver Band Pass Filter
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Figure A.2: Communication Receiver Notch Filter
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Figure A.3: Communication Receiver RF amplifier
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Figure A.4: Assembled Communication Receiver
Figure A.5: Matching circuit with tunable capacitor for metallic structure antennas
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